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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
ren years before John Locke's '§§s~ tqncgrnins Hyman Und!c!\andins received 
even its first rough form, the author's pen had been at work jotting down a 
group of essays on natural law. He never bothered to publish the essays, nor 
did anyone else unti I almost three ftl! i centuries later. In 1954, Wolfgang von 
leyden, using the authoritative Lovelace collection of Locke's work. edited 
these Essays .2!! ~qe .bm! 2! NI\Ure, 
Just why Locke never published these essays is unknown. Von Leyden offers 
several plausible reasons.' But Whatever the reasons, the essays would certain 
Iy not have caused the stir that his ~!iiax. Conc!rqins Human Understanding did; 
and they have not been heralded as prtceless dIscoveries even not/. Their 
appearance in Locke's time would have aroused little excitement because few 
people then doubted the exIstence or knowability of the natural Jaw. I n fact, 
1 Von Leyden's book contains, besides the Latin and English texts of the 
essays on the law of nature, a number of Locke's other writings, unpublished 
before now. and a lengthy introduction of some ninety pages or so in which von 
Leyden comments on different points of hIstorical interest and analyzes the 
arguments presented. Included among these introductory pages are reasons sug-
gested why the essays on natural Jaw remained unpublished. Von Leyden lists 
five such reasons: (I) the translation of the essays into English would prove 
too laborious for locke; (2) many of his Ideas were placed in the Ellay in-
stead; (3) he lacked conviction about the subject. particularly in light of his 
later hedonistic morals; (4) his views on authority changed considerably; (5) 
Locke may have felt that the essays lacked maturity of thought. John Locke, 
Essavs .sm the ~.2.f. Nature, ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford, 1954). p. 14. Tni s book 
will hencefort~ referred to 85 the Ea!ays. 
I 
2 
scholars used natural law as an initial premise in most of their discussions on 
morality and civil Jaw. The appearance of the essays in our day has aroused 
little excitement because many ItmoderiY' theories proudly disdain the natural Jaw 
doctrine. and even the growing number of proponents of natural law can find many 
another more adequate exPOsition of their position. 
Why bother, then, to expend ener9Y on these essays? The reasons are multi 
pte. For one thing, the very way modern tbeorists slough off the topic demands 
that a 1ess careless consideration be given to a doctrine that has had stuff 
enough to stay standing for twenty centurIes or so. Also, these essays fill in 
a I aeun. in Locke' s other t«)rK.s. They of fer some Jus t f fJ cat i on for hIs f requen 
references to the natural Jaw as the basis for his political theories, and they 
help bridge the gap between the dominant eq>irfcism In his epistemolOgical work 
and the rationalism of his other writings. FInally, the essays lend further 
evidence of Locke's genius in doing one thing--asking provocative questions. 
Locke asked questfons which philosophers from his tlme on have tried to 
answer. Sometimes his very way of stating problems only ereated greater diffi-
culties. but his thought never failed to stimulate. so much so that his "phil_ 
osophy exercises undisputed sway over the Ideas of the entire eighteenth centu-
ry.1I2 He interrupted the flow of philosophy to ask one particularly pertinent 
questIon: IIJust how much do we really know?" D.J. O'Connor in his conmentary 
on Locke remarks: !lBy thus raiSing the nature of knowing as a problem, Locke 
was introducing a new point of view into European philosophy. And this point 
2, sai ah Berl in, Ihe Age .2f. Enll 9btepment (Boston, J 956), p. ,30. 
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of view, for good or iiI. has dominated philosophy since his time.1f3 
"Just how much do we really know?u He had a very practical reason for 
asking the question. Locke did not sport at dialectics. He put the question 
,;lnd searched for its answer with another problem in mind. Unless he determined 
how we know and how much we know. Locke cou J d not t aekl e the d iff i cu It i as· wh i ch 
his contemporaries posed to him about morality and the natural law. I n fact, 
his EJJsl £2ncernlns Human Underat,nding might never have taken shape except for 
Locke'S pressing interest in how we come to know the rules of morality that 
should govern us. Von Leyden gives the fol Jowing, interes,ting account of how 
it was that a discussion on morality and the natural Jaw gave rise to the ~s!ax 
Concrern i OS H2!J!1!P Under! tlnd i ns. 
A gnoup of five or six of Locke'S friends were gathered for a discussion at 
the London home of Anthony Ashley Cooper, sometIme In 1671. 
Locke informs us that the topic discussed by the group at the outset 
was "a subject very remotet l from the special Inquiries into the understand-
ing which arose out of the discussions at a Jater stage and of which the 
Essay of 1690 was the final outcome. TyrelPs comment on this point is 
more ext) t i c:1 t. liThe discourse," he says. It began abou t the p ri nc i pies of 
mrs) ity and reveal'd rei igron.1f Now that we have come to know more about 
Locke's lIterary activities about 1671. Tyrel"s hint appears significant. 
t presume that the discussion among Locke's friends was at first about the 
Jaw of nature as the basis of morality and its relation to natural and re-
vealed religion. Locke's early thoughts on this topi~ served as a con-
venient starting point; and some other member of the group, possibly Lord 
Ashley himself. may have eontrlbutea the sbort essay. originally among the 
Shaftesbury Papers, beginning: liThe Light of Nature Is reason set up in 
the soul at first by God in man's Creation. seeond by Christ. tI But then. 
as Locke tells us, difficulties arose In the course of the discussion. 
possibly concerning the question how the natural Jaw comes to be known. 
3Daniei J. O·Connor, ~ L2Ske (London, 1952) p. 27 
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The question had played a prominent part in Locke's essays. but we can 
understand if his solution of it left room for doubts and puzzles. So it 
was decided to start afresh and to approach the 5ubje<::t matter under dis-
cussion on a strictly epistemological basis, i.e. to inquire into the 
origin and extent of human knowledge. The new course was taken up by 
Locke himself. and after reading out at the next meeting Itsome hasty and 
undigested thoughts" he pursued his inquiries during the su~r and autumn 
of 1671 in two preliminary drafts of the Essay which we know. 
This close casual connection between the writing of the Eas!y Concerning 
Hum!n U~r§tandins and the problem of natural Jaw has been pointed out for an 
important reason. For the first part of this thesis will concern itse'f with 
whether Locke's views on knowing the natural Jaws were consistent from these 
earl y essays through his 1 ater and more famous works. He began his EssaX Con-
cerninQ !J!..!!t:aJ3 !In.'Maadlng to clarify points at issue regarding the origin of 
knowledge. particularly in respect to rules of morality. Did his more fully 
developed thought in the ESIIY and in the lI2 TreaSiaes ~ Civil government 
confirm his initial doctrine or reject it? Are his early essays consistent 
w'th his later works or not? 
Tbe second major InvestJgation of the thesis will consider ~lether or not 
Locke's proof for knowing the natural law can withstand the objections of its 
critics. Has the argument any validity? 
Two problems then, will draw the focus of attention: the consistency of 
the !s!axs .2!l the..be.if "StuCe wIth Locke's later doctrine; and the val idlty 
of his argument for knowledge of the law of nature based on sense experience. 
Any mention of the word "consistency' in reference to Locke immediately 
rai ses problems. "Orl gi nal lt • "sttmul ati ng", 'leI ear-thi nk' ngH and many another 
5 
word of praise has been predicated of Locke, but never "consistent.1t Critics, 
students and historians are all quick to expose inconsistencies in Locke's 
doctrine. W. T. Jones, for example. notes that: "Nothing is easier ••• than 
to point out inconsistencies in Locke's theory. •• If consistency were the 
soJe element in the philosophical ideal. it would be hard to understand the 
great inf1uence of Locke's views In so many different fields. ItS Some, like 
Bertrand Russell. find little reason to become concerned about this fact,6 but 
none wIll attempt to defend Locke from all charges on this score. What Ster-
ling Lamprecht remarked concerning Locke·s ethical theories would serve as good 
advice in any treatment of Locke: lilt would be a mistake to attempt to fit all 
he said into one harmonious whoJe.u7 
Nevertheless, the bo most faaous "incongruitieslJ in Locke's theory have 
been greatly exaggerated. The first is the "apparently contradictory c1aims of 
rational ism and ElqJiricisatt8 within his theory of knowing itself. between the 
second and fourth books of the EIStX. Professor Aaron, as we shall see, does 
5W• T. Jones. A H"ioa .2.f. w.tun PhiJol9Phx (New York, 1952) p. 752. 
6 ' In his Uil&RCX s! Western PhIJO~ (New York, 1952), p. 613, Bertrand 
Russell states: "No one has yet succ ~ in i ovent' ng a philosophy at once 
credible and self.consistent. Locke aimed at credibility and aenieved It at 
the expense of conststency. Most of the great philo&Ophies have done the oppo-
site. The most fruitful philosophies have contaIned glaring inconsistencies. 
but for that very reason have been partially true. There Is no reason to 
suppose that a self-consistent system conte' ns me".e truth than one, which like 
Locke • s is obv i ous 1 y more or I ass wrong. It 
7SterJlng Lamprecht, the Morll .ID2 ~oll tical Pbi12s22hx.2! JI.2!m bocke (New 
York, 1918), p. 104. 
~. T. Jones. Bistorx at Western PhJ19!OQbx (New York, 19S2). p. 752. 
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much to explain away many of the apparent Incons'stencies tn this regard. The 
second "incongruity." which concerns us more directly, has been rather fully 
enunciated by W. S. Carpenter in his Introduction to an edition of l!2 Ir!!tises 
on Civil Government: 
It Is to the credit of Fitzjilll1e$ Stephen (in~iab"f!Sle. 11 
(London. 1891). p. ISO) truat 1M should have .. en fnt'iii pol t cal theory 
of Locke a striking incongruity with his metaphysics. The object of the 
.I.u.Ir.!9SJCO' ~ .HYmIn ~Cf5~IDS is to destroy the doc:tri ne of Innate ldiii a to re uceaflllOW age to a general ization of experience. The 
~It~U Ji!!l -'1ill "t_oS appears to be the very reverse of thl s" ~fou~ entlr~n t e two conceptions of the state of nature and 
the 1_ of reeson. and it Is diffieult to see how Locke could arrive at 
either of these conceptions from experience. They are simply fIgments of 
the lind an4 as much creatures of Locke's own fancy as Plato's B!eubJlc 
was. 
With the pubUc.tfon of the Cum .sw.J.bal:a..o! DISMre which deal preclsel 
with the derivation of the Jaw of nature from expert enee, such a gross charge 
of .. i nc:ongru i ty" aga' ns t Locke' S WI" I t i *'9' show I d neYer appear ag. in. The 
question "how Locke could arrive at either of these conceptions from experience 
receives an answer from Locke hI_elf In the essays. Dr .. von Leyden considers 
this reconcU iatlon of Locke's doctrine one of the chIef values orlsi n9 from 
the publication of these early essays: lIlt Is now possible to recognize that 
Lockefs ttc> main bo4les of doctrine, namely his political theory .nd his theory 
of knowledge, hwe a c:onmon ground and that this lies in his early doctrine of 
the natural law ... IO 
But the fact that Locke wrote _UtIDS on the emplrfeal basis for know-
Jedge of the I., of nature serves only as II beginning of the investigation. 
'w. S. Carpenter, eel. John I..ocke, De IrMtll!§ s.n "vI! &mrnment• (London •• _,. Introduction, xlv. 
lOw. von Leyden, ttJohn Locke and the Natural Law," 'bflglQBby, XX, (January 
1:17'11, .. ~. 
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Granted that he indicated an element of empirical data in founding the natural 
Jaw, many questions remain to be answered. 15 the theory of ~~wledge expound-
ed in the early essays a temporary. trial hypothesis. or is it substantially the 
same as the theory evolved by Loc;;ke in the Essay Concernins HW!:I" Under§tandins1 
Does Locke have the same concept of natural law in these initial essays as ap-
pears in the ESalX and in the Ircatia's? His ethical theory in the early ess-
ays is based on the law of nature. Does it remain based on natural law in his 
later works? 
Not every eonc.ept or term used In the ESi!>'1 .2!!the Law.2f. Nature can be 
scrutinized in the light of Jater writings, but at least some conclusion can be 
reached in regards to Locke's besic oonsistency or inconsistency. 
The problem of the validity of Locke's arguments should prove no Jess en-
gaging. Surprisingly little concern AU been shown for the argument w:>rked out 
by Locke in the essays. The essays, we are told. are important because they 
"fill in some of the detailed thinking in the concept of a 1~1 of nature which 
the SeS11!.9 IeuSh!.2!! ;Ivil GiYe(f!!R!t. omitted', JI and they show how the probJeII 
of morality influenced the inception of Locke's other works. But little or 
nothing Is mentioned regarding'the contribution of the argument itself. 12 In 
"Jobn W. Yolton, Review of the Essays: Ib! Phlloao&t!ia! Reyiew. LXVII 
(July 1955), 489. 
l1rh.following men who reviewed voa Leyden's edition of Locke's E'lft!.2!l 
the J:.e .Qf U;UyrS or \tIho wrote COI1IDentar i as on the ed i t i on had J itt t e or noth ill! 
to say about the positive contribution of Locke's argument, and none made any 
attempt to defend it: O. J. Allan, Review of the ISIIYs. ~lRfORhX, XX (April 
1956), 182-184; James Collins, '~he Year in Philosophy, 1 " Ihousht, XXX 
(Spring 1955), at.-86; John W. Lenz, "b25ke•s .iluxJ. s.a.lb! ~!J.9.f. Nature," 
Philo!9.Pbx _ PilO9f!!!nol2Slc,1 ~r~, XVII-(September 1$ , 105-11); P. G. 
Lucas, H'Uscussion: John Locke,W~ :Pemhlya! Qv'Ulr!rv. VI (April 1956), 
174-176; John W. Yolton. Realew of the Essay!: the Ph!l0l22hiS,1 Review. LXVII 
IJuJ v 19'i§) I.OftI.ftA 
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fact t O. J. Allen comments that the publication of the essays has great value 
daspi\i! "the second-rate quality of the essays themselves. lti ) 
Part of this unconcern for the subject matter of the essays, it is truo, 
~tems from a realization that Locke's arguments are far from flawless and that 
nDre satisfactory expositions of natural law doctrine can be found. AdniittodJy 
then, to defend Locke's argument as wholly valid woul_ be a rash and unwIse move 
But granting all this, a word should yet be said in defense of what Locke bas 
written. In the first place. Locke's political theory. based as it Is on this 
law of nature, carries far too much weight historically to be 51 ighted in this 
way. Our own Declaration of Inclependeneeand consti tutJonaJ form took root in 
a fundamentally Lockeian concept of natural taw. Secondly. too many writers 
noted thus far have been ail tOO quick to disregard entirely what Locke had to 
say about the law of nature. For some this disregard stem& from an Ingrained 
contempt for the whole theel-Y of natural law. Von leyden makes such an attituo 
clear tlten he coanents that: tithe ri se of modern juri sprudence is cbaracteri zed 
by the abandonment of the theory of natural law. Also most modern philosophers 
analysts as well as positivists. have come to regqrJ the notion as obsoJetc. ul4 
Led by this conviction, von Leyden then procee3~'S to make short shrift of 
Locke's argument, burying it finaily in the graveyard where he feels atl such 
arguments on natural law belong. 
130• J. Allan. Review of the II,axl. PhIl210el!X$ XX (April 1956). J~. 
J4w. von Leyden, 'IJohn Locke and the Natural Law,tt Phi losophx. XX (January 
J 956), 25. 
Istn both the article noted above and In the introductory pages of the 
Essays (pp. 4)-60) von Leyden analyzes and criticizes Locke's argument. 
9 
But we shall see that Dr. von Leyden has put the wrong corpse to rest. 
he argument that he has so neat I y shre<fded does not exact 1 y match what Locke 
If then. as should be admitted, ~ke'$ argument is not wholly defensible, 
least his thoughts on the subject deserve a much fairer treatment if only in 
the interests of historical objectivity. Yet not a singJe writer consultedl6 
kes any protest in favor of Locke and against Von Leyden's criticism. Such a 
tate of affafrs demands all the more imperatively that some defense of Locke's 
rgument be made. The part of the thesl s will en deals wi til the valldi ty of 
ocke's argument for knowledge of the natural law will not attempt to substant-
iate the who'e of Locke's argument, but it will endeavor to show that Locke's 
rgument is basically sound and far different from the interpreted argument whl 
on Leyden ascribes to Locke. 
But before beginning either the investigation into the consistency or that 
into the validity of Locke·s doctrine, It will be helpful to survey what Locke 
included in his EI'IXI5m Jit J:..t.t! .2f.l!sure. 
16 See footnote 12 on page 7 of this thesis. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROPOSITION: THERE EXISTS A LAW OF NATURE 
WI CN CAN BE KNOWN BY REASON 
THROUGH SENSE EXPERIENCE 
Loeke presented his proofs for knowing the natural Jaw in the form of eight 
essays, which probably served at some time as notes for a series of lec:tures. 
Fortunate)y, W. von Levden, "the leading authority on Locke·s manuscriPts,lt l 
edited the essays in book form. The book also presents some vaJuable prelimi-
nary discussions to which we will refer at length later in the thesis. 
fitCh of the eight essay5 answers. particular point on natural law. 
J. In the fi rst essav Locke asks, 1115 there a Jaw of nature?" He answer 
affirmatively, showing that design in the world gives proof of God's existence. 
As governor of the world, God must ordain rules of oonduct which govern men. 
These rul es are the Jaw of nature wi ch Locke delcr i be.s: "Hence, th is I aw of 
nature can be described as betng the decree of the divine will discernible by 
the I i gAt of nature and i ndi cat f OS what is and what is not in conformi ty wi til 
rational .. ture. and for this very reason commending or prohibiting.! Locke 
argues that man's special function Is to use his reason, the use of which will 
Jead him to iii knowledge of the. natural law. The fact of human conscience also 
84. 
'James Collins, "The Vear in Philosophy. 1954. 11 Ihgus!u. XXX (Spring 1955)" 
10 
)J 
lends evidence to the existence of a natural law. ~ 
The central argument In this essay shows that since there is a governance 
of the whole universe by laws, therefore man Is also bound in a way suitable to 
his nature. Furthermore, human society could never exist without natural law 
as a basis for constitutions and contracts. Without it, too, there would be no 
honor in virtue. All men would act for the sake of utility. 
2. "Can the I aw of nature be known by the tight of nature1H Locke 
answers, yes. By light of nature he means an inward process of reasoning 
starting from sense experience. He rules out knowing the natural Jaw by tra-
di t ion because tr'adi tiona di ffer, because thl5 is not a primary source of know-
ledge, and because tradition Implies trust. not knowledge. He rules out In-
scription (i.e •• innate ideas) also. But reason based on sense experience will 
dJ:c.over for us the law of nature. Reason leads us from idea$. taken from 
sense e~rience to infer the existence of God; and as soon as God Is proved. 
the notion of a universal Jaw of nature binding on all men necessarily emerges. 
Locke particularly coneerns hilD$elf In this essay with establishing the 
origin of ideas from sensation. '~e investigate here the first principles and 
sources of all kinds of knowledge, the fllaY fn .. feb primary notions and the 
elements of knowledge enter the mind.Hl Reason plays an all-important role in 
leading to a knowledge of the natural law. but it does nothing to establish the 
e1ements of knowledge. It can achieve nothi n9 unless something is fl rst given 
to it by the senses. 
12 
3. "Is the natura} law inscribed1n4 No, Locke responds, and he offers a 
:;cries of reasons why. The docirioo of innate ideas is a mere assertion and 
las so far nevar been proved. If there were such ~ natural imprint of the law 
pi nature In r.en's hearts, it \\QuId be un; versaHy known and obeyed. Thi s has 
rot taken piaco. If the law of nature were innate, primitive people should be 
he best observers of it, and the fool ish and insane should also have a knowledgE 
~f it. 
4. in the rourth essay Locke places his most i1\llortam; questions and 
fJnswors. lIean roason attain to the knowledge of natural law through sense ex-
parience?" He answers, yes. For the natural law to be known. two conditions 
ill.JSt be ful fi I led: man must be able to know that there exists a superior wi II 
'0 Wlom he is rightly subject. and that superior wi Ii must R;.lVe disclosed certair 
... Ii i ngs to be done by us respect i OS the COt'Irnands of his wi 1 J • 
Locke then explains how sensation and reason work together to gather this 
knowledge. Sensation furnishes reason with the ideas of particular objects and 
~eason then combines these ideas or images to ferm now complex ideas.S Our 
4 . Locke appears to be arguing in this essay against a very naive concept of 
nnate ideas in which the ideas are present and k~m to us at all time. clearly 
lis COIllnents on innate tOOral propositions indicate that this is so: HUncharage-
~ble as they are and aJways clear, they are known to us without any study or 
~e1i berate consi derat ion." E§saXli' p. J 374 Then he goos on to prove that no 
~uch imprint is had. Locke seems to make the same faise supposition about the 
~aturc of innate ideas in the first book of his Essgy Concernins Hyman Under-
standi nQ al so. 
SLockc makes no attefi1)t to clarify in this essay \<'"hat he means exactly by 
daas or Images. Throughout the essays we will find that his episteooJogy is 
rather crude and rudimentary. 
13 
senses teU us of bodies and their properties, of MOtion and of regularity in 
the uni verse. Reason i nqui res into these sense data and i nfe·rs the existence 
of God, particularly of God as a la\t61laker, a superior wi J 1 to whom we are suO-
ject. From tbis knowledge of God as a Jawnaker reason infers that, since tbe 
\\OrJd manifests purpose, man has a duty to use his equipment, which's reason, 
to discover his s~ciaJ roJe in tbe world. God intends certain activities to 
be perforaed by man. From this man perceives his duties to \\Orship God, to 
preserve himself, to Jive in society, and so forth. 
S. In his fifth essay, Locke denies that the law of nature can be proved 
from general consent. Whether the consent is positive, arising from a contract 
or natura), spri ngi ng from a cartal n natural i nsti net, it wi II ROt prove the 
law of nature. Certain Jaws derived fl"'Ofll positive consent have no meaning in 
the context of natural law. for ~le. the positive agreoo.ent that safe 
pa.sage will be given to all envoys bas no particular foundation in the natural 
Jaw. The natural law forbi ds altogether the i nj ury of any person and suggests 
no additional reaSOll why this should be more true for an envoy than for anyone 
else. 
A consensus of practh;e offers even I ass reason for provi"9 the 1 aw of 
nature. uFor if what is rightful anr.l lawful were to be determined by men's 
way of living. noral rectitude and integrity ~utd be d('ne fO,..'16 The Egypt-
. ians and Spartans approved of stealing. The Assyrians ood Ethiopians practi~ 
customs totally indecent and unchaste. Certain Indian natives Justified sui-
cide. A Brazi 1 ian tribe acknowl'~Bed no God at all • 
... 
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On the other hand. even If there were general consent regarding some opinlot. 
this consent WGuld not be sufficient to prove that the opinion fell under the 
natural J m'4. 
6. HAre It3n bound by the 1 aw of nature?" Ves, says Loeke. He borrows 
the Jurists' definition of obligation; "it is the bond of law whereby one Is 
bound to render tlhat is due. lIl Obi igatlon Is had Whenever a rightful power im-
poses CIt COtlIDand upon us, making his wi II known to us. The perception of this 
obI i gati on may arhe either frOO'l fear of punishment, or better from a "rational 
apprehension of .. at Is rI9ht/'S The natura) Jaw binds because it contains all 
the necessary condItions noted above. A rightful power is had by God as the 
creator of all thtngs, and His will is known to us in the natural law, in the 
~~y described in the fourth essay. 
7. Ills the bindIng force of the natural law perpetual and universa)?11 
lYes. After answerIng a doubt about the existence and bindil19 force of the 
natura) 1 aw, Locke proceeds to expJ at n in what sense the 'aw is perpetual. not-
ing the different types of obligatorv acts involved. Aetua1ly. he gives no 
proof for the perpetua t character of the natura J Jaw, but on I y remarks that 't 
is coeval with the human race. The binding force of the natural law Is uni-
versa I because it is ~ted in human nature, which is everywhere the same and 
wi 11 not enange. 
8. His :nan's own interest too basis of natural Jaw?n Locke denies that 
it is. He first explains his terms by defining 1IIilat he means by "basis of the 
7H~id •• p. lSI. 
~Ibid., p. U35. 
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natural law' and by "each mants fnterest.,,9 Then he states the question IOOre 
precisely: "Hence the point of the question is precisely thfs: Is it true that 
·;lIat each individual in the circumstances Judges to be of advantage to himself 
and his affairs is in accordance with natural Jaw, and on that account is not 
only la\'lfuJ for him but also unavoidable, and that nothing hl nature is binding 
except so far as it carries with it some itmlediate personal advantages. IIIO 
locke denies this for three reasons: Private interest cannot be the basis or 
the Jaw of natl,.lre because (1) dut i ful act f ons do nqt at'i se out of .re ut i Ii ty, 
and virtue often consists in doing sood to our own toss; (2) if private inter-
est were the basis of the law, it ~)d be impossible to avoid conflict of 
interests. and U) all justice, friendship and gener05ity would be abolished. 
Hence. locke concludes. personal advantage is a consequence of obedience to the 
natural law rather than the basis of it. 
Von Leyden, in his intl'odU(;torv notes. synthesizes th¢ tnought of these 
essays and Locke's process of argumentation according to four main aspects: 
He passes from the re.~nition that man is rational to the assumption 
that man's reason. on the basis of sense experience, leads to the discover' 
of moral truths, then If property employed, to the discovery of one and 
the same set of moral truths. i.e. natural law. From this he passes to 
the be J i ef that the truths thus discovered are d f vine coum.;mds bind i n9 on 
all men, and hence to the assertion that the validity of such ~mnands can 
be proved, and even shown to be necestary in the S~i \~y as a geometrical 
demonstration. I I 
Von Leyden considers Locke's argument to be fallacious, involving un-
'E§iiYS,PP. 205-207. 
! 0.!Jl.!.i., p. 207. 
U'bist., p. 59. 
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~nrranted 1 eaps between d i ffer-ent p. anes of knowl ed:)e. In a briefer fonm, the 
path he believes Locke to follow is this: man is rational; his reasoa leads to 
ooral truths; these ooral truths are the same for al J men and are obi iging on 
~li as divine coanands; tberefore, they are valid and necessary_ 
This interpretation misses, it seems, the crux of Locke's argument. But 
~n evaluation of his interpretation will be the conoern of Chapter IV. What 
~ar$ to be oore important for Loc.ke than the fact of man's rationality is the 
pvera) l des i gn man ites tIn the \l«)rI d. Th is des i gn reveal s the governance of a 
~upreme intel' ig.nee (God). Kan, too must be governed by this God, since God 
faust have had SOlie purpose in creating him. And only vmen this governance by 
~od is recognized, only then can we say that man's reason, on the basis of sense 
pxperience, Jeads to the disoovery of moral truths. Han's reason does not Just 
~an4ar about and happen upon the natural Jaw.. I t sets out to find someth log 
it knows exi sts. 
Lockets basic argument, then, \«)Old seem to be rather aloog these li005;12 
It is quite obvious from the design in the world that &Orne almighty lawgiver and 
governor (God) exists. It is unreasonable to suspect that man is not included 
in the averan design. Hence, there must be a law particularly directed to man 
Find his conduct. it law that befits man's nature. 
But how can man know God.s law or design In his regard? The answer is: 
by using what is his natural equipment. his reason. If no uses his reason 
l2rhis disagreement with von Leyden in the interpretation of Lockets srgu .. 
~nt will be taken up and discussed in detail in Chapter IV of the thesis. The 
SUil'f'ilaries given here are hltended merely to point out the central problem and 
the line of thought in the essays. fuller documentation will also be given. 
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properly, he can discover God's law In his regard. But how does one use hiS 
reason properly? Locke answers that this Is done by a combination of sense 
experience and reason. fIrst, from the design in the world we infer God's 
existenee. As our creator, He has a rightful power over us. As 8 wise cre-
ator, God has is fixed purpose for us. Hence, He has sOOlething in mind for us 
to do. Once we know that He has some purpose for us, we search for what the 
lIsomethlng" may be. The "something" God Intends for us to do can be Inferred, 
however, from His ultimate purpose (His Glory) and from our own enc:.l<Mnents, par-
ticularly from reason. And from this we conclude to our duties to God, 'self, 
and others. 
Obligation to a law arises when there Is a superior will over us which will 
Is somehow disclosed to 1.15. 13 But the natural law contains these two requisite 
so that .t clearly obliges man. The supreme will over us is God; Hia will is 
disclosed to us Indirectly as we discover little someth'ngll which he Intends for 
us to do. 
This, In short, is what Locke has to say in the early essays about the law 
of nature. The eShYs uncover for us Locke IS thoughts on the theory of cog-
nition, the notion of God, the concept of natural law, and other subjects which 
bear upon his later writings. Included too, Is a rather emphatic, statement and 
proof of the existence, f<.nt'JlW8bi I Ity and binding force of the law of nature. 
Ilrhls particular notion of obligation and many other exprGssions used by 
Locke are distinctly voluntaristic. 
CHAPTER II. 
ARE LOCKE'S STATEMENTS ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURAL LAW 
COnSISTENT WITH HIS LATER WORkS? 
To evaluate the eonsistency of the IiSHxt !m. !h! ~ 21 Nature with Locke's 
later work., two comparison. mu.t be made. One comparison concerns episte-
~logy. It wtll relate Locke's statements on knowing the natural law in the 
~arly essays to his genera! theory of cognition as found In the EssaX £oncerning 
ttuman Y!!.<l!rstandigg_ The second comparison involves the notion of natural law • 
... oc:ke·s concept of the 1.'1 of nature as presented in the early essays must be 
e.Kam.ned in relation to the references I'I.'tade to natural law In the Essay ,tonce!:!!-
!!J.9 Human !l!!5!!.t~landin9 and In the Second Tr!M!ti!e..2.'l Clvil GovermentO' 
The first comparison on epistemology is the more difficult. CrItics of 
,.oc:ke have not been slow to point out numerous Inconsistencies within Locke's 
fInished Essax of 1690. Yet that Essay has the advantage of nearly thi fty years 
for developnent and refinement af thought over the EssaXI 2!l !!2! !:!! g.f. !fature. 
~ full and carefully del ineated theory of ~Iedge. then, can hardly be expectec:l 
~roro the early essays. Hence, the com~rison of the ways of knotrlledge in these 
two works will necessarily be restricted to main outlines with little attempt at 
:leta I led analysis.. The comparison should be suffltient, however, to indicate 
",hether the early essays contained the seeds of his later thought or whether the~ 
give Initial. trial Ideas later to be rejected. 
The E.saX ~9.~rntn.s ,Human Understandi~.sh besides being Locke's most famous 
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~rk. contains practically all of Locke's epistemology. We mIght begIn our 
1cO'11II".-l8r.sons, then. by studying whether Locke's remarks on hl.lD!m understanding In 
the early essays fIt Into his later doctrine in this gsslY_ 
In the early essays he informs us that there are only three ways In wllich 
~ could come to the knowledge of anything: 'Whatever we know Is eIther in-
I 
scribed, from tradition, or drawn from the senses. 1t He rules out inscription 
(I.e., Innate Ideas) and tradlt Ion. and settles upon knowledge drawn from the 
senses. This Is man's natural way of knowing, or as Locke phrases it, Itknawing 
by the light of nature alone.·,2 By saying that something can be known by the 
1 ight of nature Itwe mean nothing else but thet there is some sort of truth to 
the knowledge of which. man can attain by himself and without the help of an-
other, If he makes proper use of the faculties he Is endowed with by nature. li) 
What are these facultlel?4 They are Simply reasoning and sense expertence. 
Locke explains at length the role of each of these faculties and how the twe 
work together. Sense _perlenee gives us ilpr'mary notlonl and elements of 
knowledge.IIS It furnishes reason with "Ideas of partIcular sense objects.u6 
',slays, p. 125. 
2 Ibid •• p. 133. 
3'bld •• p. 123. 
4ay faculties, Locke simply means different functions or powers of the mind 
The word is not intended in the technical, scholastic sense. 
SESSayS, p. 125. 
6 
'bid. t p. 147. 
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Its function Is to supp1y reason with matertal for Its work. Sense experIence 
alone wi J I not suffice, "for wIthout reason, though actuated by our senses, we 
can seereefy rIse to the standard of nature found In brute beasts, seeing that 
the pig and ape, and many other quadrupeds, fer surpass man In the she.-,ness of 
the senses. tl7 Sense experience and reason mast serve c.ach other. "scO$Ctlon 
furnIshing reason with the Ideas of particular sense objects and supplying the 
subJec:t metter of discourse, reason on the other hand guiding the faculty of 
$ense, and erranging the Images of things derived from sense percept ion, thence. 
formIng and composing new one5.118 
ReHon, we find. guides .the sense faculty, arranges Images and composes 
from them. But It allO usearches .net discovers JfIWS,H9 end by It "one may find 
~ way from perceptIble and obvious things Into their hidden nature. IIIO tn 
l'Xk.els fullest descrlpUon of reeson It fs "the dlsc!lrslve faculty of the mind, 
which advances from things ~ to things unknaMt .. and argues from OM thing to 
another In a definIte and fixed or.r of propositions.ull 
Hence, ruson arranges • .,.ides, c:ompo$e5 t argues, searches, Infers and 
concludes ...... vast number of tasks. Nevertheless, it depends anti rely Oft sense 
for its mater.al. "Admittedly, reason makes use of these elements of 
71\!d. 
S'bld. 
9'bld •• p. 111. 
HJ'bld. 
11 Ibid., p. 149. 
-
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:<.oowledge, ••• but It does not. in the least establ ish them. lIJ2 Take away 
either sense or reason and the other is of no aveil. But with the t\'IO working 
together, lithere is nothing so obscure. so eon~led, so removed froen any ~n" 
Ing that the mind. capabie of everything. could not apprehend it by reflection 
I '~ 
and reasoning. If it is supported by these faculties." .. 
Locke then describes the actual process by whieh the natural law is knatm. 
First, sense teaches us the real existence of $olld bodies and especially that 
"this world is constructed with wonderful art and regularity.U t4 Then the mind 
Hafter more carefully considering In Itself the fabric of this world, ••• 
thenee proceeds to an inquiry into the origin. to find what was the cause, and 
Jli 
who the maker of such a work.!1 - From this inquiry,reason concludes to a wise 
creator whose wi II governs us and has power over us. 
In demonstrating that this. wise creator and superior wi II (God) has laid 
down certain things to be done by us, locke Is not $0 expliCit in Indicating 
just what sense and reason each contribute to the argument. Sense plays a 
SiMller part here. perhaps observing mants rational acts as distinguished from 
a4:ts of l<::.IWer antmals. 16 But reason carries the load by thowing that God has 
a purpose in creating us and that this purpose involves us in using our par'" 
12Ibid •• p. 125. 
13'bld •• p. 147. 
14 Ibid .. , p. lSI. 
IS Ibid •• p. 153. 
16Loc.ke frequently uses sense In as wide D meaning and scope as this. 
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ticular e~nents for acting rationally, and that by so acting we will be led 
t.o the observance of definite moral rules befittIng our nature. 
The fact of the Interrelationship of sense and reason has certainly not 
been neglected. But Locke offers little detailed e.x.pJanatlon about the knoIWlns 
process, so that great gaps lie open in his theory and many questions remain 
unanswered. 
To fi 11 In all the details, If such a thing were even poSSible, would 
involve over-lengthy and unnecessary speculation. Jne obvious lacuna, hOJlevcr. 
should at least receive some comment if Locke·s theory Is to hang together at 
aH.. According to Locke, we have the senses at workp then reason takes over. 
But do the senses present kna.'ln Ideas? Or does reason work wi til pure sen-
sations? Or Is there some other faculty at work converting sensations Into 
known Ideas with which reason can work? Even in the crudest descriptions of 
knowing. we do not think of sense data as fuJ l-bh'Mn ideas or knoIln truths. 
And yet Locke tells us quIte elearly that lithe mind c:&MOt discourse or reason 
without some truth that Is given or perceived. Ill] 
The solution seems to be that Lcx:ke has some other power in the bacf< of 
his mind as being at work here. sanething quIte close to the llperceptlonli whicl"! 
he describes In the EINX Concerning H'-IQBn Understanding. II, 9. Otherwtse s 
his ideas on cognition would appear IncredIbly naive. He notes, for Instance, 
that the fact that Uthls visible world '1 constructed with wonderful art end 
18 
regularity ••• we INrn from the senses." Vet notions of regularity, 
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structuro and order could hardly be classified as sensations. 
Locke gives sone indication at least that he did have a power such as per-
ception in mind. for instance. In his Initial discussion of the light of 
nature. Locke mentions that man is endowed with three IXX'lers. ''wIth understand-
i 09. reason and sense percept ion. 1119 
We might safely presume, then, that the idea which reason handles. the 
"truth that is gIven !!!'! e!rcetr~,1120 Is • product of the combined efforts of 
sense and percept ion. 
But even with this ackUUon, Locke has offered only the simplest descriptio 
of cognition, explained entirely In terms of the senses end of reason. with 
perception perhaps understood. Little or nothing is said about first prlncipl. 
such u those of causality or fina'lty_ Much Is taken for granted. But we 
!..aYe seen what constitutes Locke·s bas'e theory of eognition In the Essaxs 2!l 
~ Y! .2! Nature. 
Same eIght or ten years passed between the wrltlft9$ of these essays end the 
historic diSCUSSion of 1671 whieh led to Locke's first IItlasty and undigested 
thoughts" on cognition end finally to the thoroughly worked out ~ssax ~rning 
Human Understanding In 1690. The thl rty Intervening years brought Locke many 
deeper Insights and a c:ritlcal awareness of the difficulties In explaining the 
<"...Q'llPlIcated process of hf.l'lMtft cognition. Vet even thirty years did not suffice. 
Locke' s II n I shed EsseX It 111 needed a greet dea} of ref I nement and reargon I-
19 l~ld., p. 123. 
20 Ibid., p. 149. Italics not In the original. 
24 
utian. 21 It does, however, present a fuller and more meaningful account of 
cognition than the early essays. The followl"" In capsule form, is what 
Locke'. famous l'faX 'oncernias Human Understanding tells us about human 
knowleage. 
We begin wIth. ,.sslw. blank mind, a YRYla E4!!. In the Inltl.l stage 
of our knowing the mInd Is receptive. It takes In pri.ry Ideas eIther from 
sensation or from reflec;tiora. 22 The prl.ry icleea from senHtlon enter as 
three types: (I) We get Idees about the sollellty, the motion or the impene-
trability of things. These properties actually belong to the things them-
selves. (2) We receive Ideas about color, heat. taGte, end so forth. These 
do not actually belong to the things we see and taste, but sane property of the 
thing, such as motion, acts upon our minds In such a way that we have a sensa-
tion of color or taste and we attribute It to the thlnt Itself. (3) We 8150 
receive knew1edge about the way in which thiags act upon us. for exemple, we 
knclw that the sun causes US to &:Ie warna and that a wind has the power to blow OUI 
211vea such a favorable critic as Richard Aaron had to conclude "that 
Locke's theory of knowledge is .defectlve In being both Incomplete and inco-
herent." Richard I. Aaron, John Locke, 2nd eel. (OXford, 1955), p. 247. 
ala· .... t us then suppose the mind to be, as .. say, White paper, void of all 
ehar~ters. wIthout any ideas; how comes It to be furnished? ••• To this I 
answer, in one .rd, from ex.perlenc:e: In that all our knowledge is founded. 
and from that ultimately cIerh •• Itself. Our observation, empJoyed either 
about external sensible obJecU, or about the Internal operation. of our minds, 
••• Is that which supplies our understanding with all the material. of think-
Ing. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we 
have, or can naturally have do sprlng.1t John Locke, An aIry ,oncernint HtJl18n 
Under~ln,. eel. Alexander C. Fraser (OXford, 1904) ... , • 2. Hence orth 
this k wI 1 be referred to as !!! Essax. References are given ac:eordlng to 
book, chapter and paragraph In this book. 
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hat off. 23 
All theM are --.1es of prt_tv Ideas comlas from sensation. But - mal 
also pick up Ideas from experiencing the feet of thinking, of des I rfng, and $0 
forth. These corne to us as we reflect on what we are doing_ All of the.e 
cane to the mind In the first stage of receptive knowledge. 
''Receptive'', however. is not meant to Imply total Inactivity on the part oi 
the mind. The mind must take notice of the senH data before we can be $a.d tc 
have ideas. This takin, notice of sense data Locke calls perception.. It 
would seem definitely to be an intel1ectua' activity since he says tbat it is 
llby S(Q8 calJed 'thinking' In general,,,24 and he regards the idea produced as 
"present in the understand'ng.I.!S 
-, -~' 
So whaoover we have sl..". Ideas. we know that the mind has been active in 
perception. Se ..... MtNrience tell8lns. ~ the less, predominantly passive. 
ufor in beret naked perception. the Blind is for the most part, only pas,lve. ancl 
'What It perceive, it cannot avoid percelvlng_H26 It is Intere'tlng to note, it 
"'.'nt. thet It wes Just such an operation as perception that we found unac-
eounted for in Loc:ke's early theory in the be¥! 2!l She Law of Mgture. 
$0 the mind Is not Inoperative In perceptioa. but it I ies almost dormant 
until the second stage of the proeoss. TheA the mind moves fnto a~tIOR. w. 
2lrhis dlvlsia of primary Ideas is treated by Locke In An EssaX, II. G, 
9 .. B. 
24'bI4., II, 9, l-
251blel• , tI. 9. 2. 
26 Ibid., II, 9, 1. 
bogln actively using our faculties. The mind works with simple, primary Ideas 
that it has received, to form CQ1'lPlex ideas. 27 It fonns them in ~hree ways: 
"-. I r: ~,., . .'. '~-', 
The acts of the mind I.\Ihereln It exerts its power over Its simple Id005 
are chiefly these three: (I) Canbining several simple ideas into COI11pOUnd 
ones; and thus all complex ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two 
ideas, whether simple or canplex. together, and setting them by one another 
so as to take a view of them at once, without unating them Into 000; by 
which it gets all its ideas of relations. (3) The third is separating them 
frail all other idGas that aecompany them In thel r real existence; and this 
Is caned ilabstractionH and thus all its general ideas are made. 23 
By c~npoundin9, by relating, and by abstracting, then, ~ obtain all our 
;~Jex ideas just as all our primary ideas cane fron sensation and reflection. 
Those simple and co:nple:x ideas described above are the w::>rking elcmants o'f 
~hi s f fl tile fourth book of the C.SS8Y. He defines vna:dedge as the ilparcept ion 
'f the connection and agreement, or disagree1letlt and repugnancy, of any of our 
; ,ti"Ulo4': 1,29 
?I ..... '.....w.-_ 
Agreement or dis8greo.'iM.'mt of ideas rests (.)41 a four-fold basi s. "To under-
r.>tand a i ittle lOOre distInctly, "'/!lerein this agre~ment or disagree.11ent eonsist$. 
27. t Should be noted that Locke uses the word ;'idoo" in a rather swoepin9t 
sa )-embracing fashion. "Idea" is the term wnh:oh he feels "serves best to stand 
~!:.:;·r wi1atsoever is the object of the un<ierst&ndiD'J when G man thinks. I bave 
lsed it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion or species, or whatever 
it Is ~1hic.h the mind can be Employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid 
~requently using 1t.1i !.'l ~!say. " I. 8. 
aa JItL<!., It, 12, 1. 
291P..~ •• tV, It t. This definition ~nits Locke to a theory of represen-
tltionalis."l\J e three .. layer world of mind, idea sod tlbjeet. "The mind in all it~ 
I:hOUgtlts ••• hath w> other frmedlate object but its ~n ideas ••• it is only 
r':ryn\1et"sant about then. ii jJl.t~. 
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I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts: (1) Identity, or diversity" 
(2) Relation. (3) Co-exlstence. or necessary OOMeCtlon, (4) Real existence. u30 
The categories which nnst c:onc;ern this thesis are relation and real ex'" 
istence. For relations under. Ie moral ity as well as mathematics, Which Locke 
most frequently uses for examples. In the §ssey, gn the ~ 2! N8tu!.~) al .. 
though he makes no direct reference to the concept of relation, Locke parallels 
the derivation of a truth from moral laws to the derivation of a mathematical 
t!~1ih. "In fact It seems to me to follow just as necessarily from the nat.ure 
of utan that, if he is a man, he is bound to 'ove and worship God, ••• as it 
foll('Al$ fran the nature of s trBangle that, if it is is triangle, its three 
angles are equal to two right angles.1I31 
In respect to the agreement of ideas baM on rea. exi stenee. Locke COI'IIili ts 
himself strongly. liAs to the fourth sort of our knatlledge, viz. II of the real 
actual existence of things, \\Ie have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; 
Ij demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God; of the existence of anything 
else. we have no other but a sensItive kfQfledge. Which extends not beyond the 
objects present to our senses .,,32 
Our knowledge of self Is Simply a direct: perception of our own action, in 
this case without the Intervention of any hfee. 33 Lockets argument for tht~ 
30 lbld., IV. I, 3. 
31 IssaD. p. 199. 
32&1 i!.sa..,x. I v. 3. 2.1. 
33Accordlng to Locke's C»In criterion, kf'KJllfiedge of self would not be true 
knotl ledge , because If there is no idea of self there can be no perception of 
agreernent • 
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p;xistenc:e of God varies fran his approoch to that subject in the [S§ilYS-2!l !h!. 
~l 2f. Nature. In these early essays the proof was, for the most part, a demon-
~tr&tion frQll design in the world. Here Locke is arguing from the contingency 
pi his own existence to the necessary existence of God. 34 Our knowledge of sel 
~nd God. resting as it does on Intuition and demonstration. is certain. When 
'JC comes to knowledge of other real beings. Locke is not quite so sure; ~'There 
Sf indeed. another perception of the tnlnd employed about the particular ex" 
stenc:e of finite beings \"Jtthlllut us; whfch, golng oeyond bare proUablUty, and 
Vet not reac;hing perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, 
~sses under the oorlle kn<Mlodge.1I35 
We find now ti~t those ideas whose agree.1lent C"'· disagroe-nent we SOi.tght to 
~imply presents a prag-aatic oorm rei· distinguishing between ideas of wcist.ing 
-hings and Ideas of imaginary beings. The norm is our consciousness ai' tIle 
~Hferenc:e between t.he two; the differeru;e we perceive between seeing too sun 
~iJrin9 the day and thinking of it in the night. and also the differences in the 
~onsequences. the di fference between dreaning c·f a fi re and actually ooi09 
!lurned by it. 
This covers, for the {ilOSt part, the que.stion of !!:!!! we know. the iJbjective 
tHtrt of our definhion of knowledge concel'ning the egreement or dlse9ree.~nt 
~tween our Ideas. OUf kneMledge is based on identity, reiatl;:m. co-existence 
!!nd real existen<:e, wIth the lest mentioned 'neluding knowledge of seH~ God. 
34l!!! ESH¥.. 1\1. lOt t-{;. 
3Slbi~ •• I\i. 2.,14. 
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and other things. 
But the oonpJete definition 'nc:.luded .!!!1 \'Ie knclrJ; the perception of this 
3greenent or disagreemant of ideas. locke handles the problem of hat4 \'16 sttal 
to eertain knowledge in a section on the degrees ot; knowledge, Book IV, Chapter 
2. t~t every instance t1here the mind Is ~nployed in perceiving identity, 
relations, co-e.xistence or reel existence, is a case of perfect knowledge. 
Whether knowledge is true or not depends on hott the perception is made, or what 
kind of perception Is had. If. for Instance, a relation Is only presumed and 
judged to be there, only probabll Ity results. But if the perception is an 
unnistakable insight, then true KflO.'Iledge is had and such a perception is Gall 
an Ilintuitlon." Locke describes this intuition rather fully in Book IV~ 2. i 
of the Essay. 
Intuition is the basis of all true knowledge. Only knowledge of exlstenc 
in sensation escapes Intuition, and eYen this is a kind of intuition on a sense 
level. All other knowledge can be traced ultimately to one or more intuitions 
There if:; another way, however, of achieving knowledge. It involves intu-
ition but It also goes beyond it. This Loc:ke cal is ciemonstratlon. Where the 
r.temOry does not fal I, certainty can be had through danonstratioo. Certain 
rnathoolatlcal propositions and propositions concerning lil.."1rality. for instance, 
are known to be true; yet thei r truth is not intnediately perceived Just fron) 
an analysis of the statement. Take for example the theorem .that en exterior 
angle of e triangle equals the sum of the two remote interior angles. This 
statenent Is certain but Is not Intuited. 
f~n ~ne intuited facts. 
It is derived ultImately. however. 
Intuition. demonstration end sensation constitute an answer to ~ the 
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By ~, loe'«! has cover-ad rat'.cr wei i tht': matter suggested in his Intro· 
duction: lito inquire Into the origin, certainty, and extent of human know-
ledge.n36 The odgin he has stated quite clearly: al i knCMiedge is ba$4i.!ld on 
what is, received either by reflection or through the senses. 
The certainty of oor l<.nowledge he has dellooated but has been very re-
strlctive In doing so. Liy Identity we gain certain trifling truths. Ily 
relation we have s~t more Instructive Ki~lcdge', particularly In 11lathe-
matics and In morality. By co-existence \'lie attain very little certitudo. 
Concerning real exlst.ence we have certain K,oowic>clgc only of ourself and Goo', 
and kna.-iledge not qui to so CGrta'n of other things which are present to the 
senses. 
The extent of our krn<Jledge locke has not quite been able to determine. 
Certainly It extends no further than our ideas$ and Is in fact MrrQNfer than 
the scope of theca. we eamot know any material thing ~npl&tely. so that we 
have no /<nowledge of the: real essences of thinss;.:n On the other hand, our 
k.nowledge does extend at 1~lt. to k.nowledge of ourselves. God, mathematical 
36an gSAX. I. 1,2.. 
37Lockefs doctrine that we have no 1<11atI1edge of the real essences of 
things, which Is dealt wIth particularly In Book III of the EIsel liOn Worebll , 
relses an Important problem In respect to this thesis. For man 5 eSSGne6 or 
nature must be kna.-m in order to know' the Jaw of nature. But in his ti.SS8n on 
the Law of Nature locfre ~re discusses whether we know the rGa 1 essence of 
man,So tilai this problem belongs rather to the discussion on the validity of 
his proofs. and need not concern us at present. 
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truths and rules of morallty.Sa 
But one final problem Is bothering Lock£l. Is all this knCMledge real? 
if it does not tell us about the world we live in. of what use Is it to f~ our 
ideas? Locke realizes that his definition of kncMiedge as the perception of 
agreement between idees has cut him off fran the world. And even hh remarks 
lC04x.ernlng the knowledge of the real existence of things pertains only to ex"" 
istence and not to a kncMledge of what they are. 
Locke began by insisting strongly that Dil kOOl\fledge must derive ulti!1lately 
~rom the senses. His empi ricJsm was the ru. ing note. Then he suddenly found 
himself In Book tV living in the realm of 'dees. a ratione1fst building Ideas 
iJpon Ideas. N<J..I he reel i:e:es that he must reassert empiricism again and connect 
deas to reality. His very procedure underlies r.1UCI1 of the confusion that has 
~thered about the "critical problem. tI He placed himself In an impossible 
!:>Osition. and the H~s. Berkeleys and Kants to fol Jow made certain that the 
UJeama was not overlooked. It Is to lockels credit. however, that he recog-
l'Zed the difficulty and triod to eradicate It. Aaron argues, too, that loc!<e 
lias not quite so inconsistent as he Is claimed to be by tho$e who see a conplete 
38Actually, Locke nowhere reaUy proves that morality is capable of demon-tration. AU that he says Is that the idea of ourselves as subject to God ~uJd "lf duly considered and pursue:d, afford such foundations of our duty and i"ules of action as might plaee morality attPIl9 the scIences capable of deroon-~tratlon." An Isex. tV. 3, 18. He gives one (I»~Je on property to illustrate ~ such a sCTence might unf::)Jd. But nothing more Is giwn. 
3'" reversal of field frcxn the second to the fourth book of the E$say. ;. 
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Our kn~11odge is not just b.:lre vision. It can be and is real where ideas 
Clgree wIth things. Locke Is stHI trapped In representationalism: lilt is 
evhk.":f1t the mind knows not things il11"llediately but only by the Intervention of 
the ideas It has of them"ll40 But k~'edge can be rool when IIthere is a con" 
form tty bet\..een our I deas end the rca Ii ty of ttl i ngz .. }!1 
Locf-'.e attempts to explain by examples how such a conformity betwoen Ideas 
and reality can be had. Simple Ideas agree with thtngs because the mind can-
not matte them of Itself; so the things rJfI.Jst be prooucing these perceptions In 
us. With compler. Ideas. excepr. of substance. there Is no problem, because tIle) 
arc of the mind's a,1n makIng and not Intended to be referred to the existence 01 
39ln hfs conmentary on Locke .. Richard Aaron has defended Locke from rash 
char90s of tneol't!ltstency. In fhc>~r. I', whore rr.any heV€' Int~rpf'Cted Locke's 
e:np'riclsm as almost pure $ensatIOMlIs:n. Aaron argues that ufron the cont~'(t it 
is quite claar that he has something I ike the intuition of Book I'J in mlnd.1! 
Richard I. Aaron, ~ohn Locke, 2nd eel. (Oxford, 1955) t ,. 34. Again when he 
treats of Intuition in Book IV and the apparent abandomllilutt of empiricIsm. Aaror 
defends him: 
Is Locke Inconsistent? ties he thrOJm his empiricism overboard and bec:.alle 
a CartesIan ratIonalist? • do not think so. For whIle Locke's teaching 
is idc,(";tical with Descartes' as to the subjective side of tho experience, 
It is not so with regard to the object. ve ••• For Descartes the object oi-
intuition is a pure non-sensuous object; for Locke is a relation between 
certain SIY!nt of sensation or reflection, or between complex Ideas dar-fwd 
from this g!ven. Aaron, p. 222. (ttaltes in the original). 
Athlttlng that Locke handled poorly the section which attempts to show the 
reality of knowledge. Aaron concludes that Locke's final answer Is found in lV, 9~ 3-4 wIth the real knowledge of $elf, God, and ot~r things at least by sen ... 
s.9tlon. 
4;) an §ssax, IV. 4. 3. 
41 Lbld. 
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anyth I ng. Substances. Loc:ke aelm its. fa i I to be exact I y conformed to the rca II 
ty outside us. 
The difficulties with th(,);~c orguments are too rtUiaerOU$ to mention. At 
least ~.Je can say that loe~ sa; the problem; and "\litl1 an interpretation such a 
that made by Professor Aaron. much of Loekels doctrine C.cUI be salvaged and made 
to appear less openly inconsistent. 
We have, then, at least Q fal rly clear and c:ompNhensive view of locke's 
general theory of hUIMn c:ognition. His knc:Ml41edge originates with sense 
oxperienc.e, with the mind bui Iding from primary ideas or notions by COfopounding 
and comparing. to <:.OIJ,.,lox ideas" then ordering these by reason and demonstrati 
to further heights if knowledge. And this, in CS5eI1(;e, is the sane descriptio 
more fully developed, that. he gave In the I!YYS .2D. W. ~ 2f. l1!tur,. Just 
how much the theories of cognition presented in these t\'tI.) \«)rks resemble each 
other we can n<7d investigate. Gut two rather important probl_s must be 
answe.red before a legitimate conduslon can be reached. 
First, In lootdng ().af:k over the two works that we have been comparing, a 
fairly obvious difficulty appears regarding the use of the term "reason." In 
the early essays reason performs nearly every function of the mind. in the 
later I'HX reason is rarely mentioned. But, as \fie shall see, the difficulty 
resolves Itself Into .. difference of terminology rather than of doctrine. 
Locke uses reason in a far more generiC way in the 05~.ays on natural law than he 
does In the gssex Concerning !!.~n q~rstancUgg. 
In the early essays, cognition was explained in terms of Just two faculties 
sense and reason, although perception mey have been understood. Sense provided 
the Nter.a1 for reasoning; rooson carried on fram there. In the later Essay, 
~Gnse wins the sane emphasIs and is explaIned in a sinai Jar fashion, but the rest 
pi cognition Is handled wIth barely a reference to IlreasonH, which does not make 
its appearance until nearly the end of the fourth book. In fact, so much of 
pognition has been explained without reason In the bsey that Locke even 
~uest'ons ''what room then Is there for the exercise of any other faculty but 
putward sense and Inward pereeption? What need Is there of reason?1I4! 
As Locke answers this question end explains the Important role of reason, 
~cscrlbin9 what sort of faculty it Is. we seem to recognIze a fami Har friend. 
~eason dIrects the process of arranging Ideas and it perceives the connections 
petween these Ideas just as reason dId In the early essays. It discovers 
proofs; It puts then In order to make their connections clear; it perceIves 
heir connection. and it fllBkes rIght conclus'ons.43 Olstingulshlng reason 
':::rom faith, Locke explaIns the use of reason in the fol lowing way: HReeson •• 
• take to be the d i scove rV of the carta I nt yo.· probab n Ity of such propos i t:t on! 
:>r truths wh i ch the 111 i nd arr i YeS at by deduct hms, made f rom such I dess wh i en it 
laS glt by the use of its natural facultIes, viz., by sensation or reflection. u4J 
~ea50n is a discovery, arrived ot by deduction. made frQ'll ideas got from sen-
sation" So the general tone end description seems to be the 5a1l8 in the early 
~ssays and In the ~,SHY £.orsernfns HtII1i!!l Under:!.tooding. The difficulty lies in 
I:'econci ling the use of the t«)rd llreasonll • In the early essays reason mane~ 
~'H"actieaJly 811 the inteUeetool duties of the mind. It CQllJ)Ounded. inferrod J 
4·2 &t iSiaX. IV. 17. 2. 
431bid •• IV, 17. 3. 
4l·,bic[. , IV. la, 2. 
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C<?nCluded end $0 forti.. tn the Essay reason appoor to be relegated to a mInor 
rolo. Has his thovry of cognit.ion changed? 
The evldem:e is hardly woighty enough to demand sueh a conclusion. locke 
l..Is;es pe rcept i on arid rooson i rt the sense of p<::J.«;rs of the sou I rather than as 
distinct faculties·. Also, just as perception must have been taken for granted 
granted throughout the €,se~. 1\'10 ootOl'lOrthy authors support this V'G1. 
Sterl ing Lamprecht says: i\'ooke supposed that the i:nportance of reason wcs so 
universally accepted that he noed not dwel! on it ~n his Essay o ll45 And 6ert-
rand Russell adds: '''''hat Loc:!~e r~am; by lrca!':Cln 1 is to be gat he rod from his 
w.~:)ie book. There 1&. It Is true. a chapter cat led 'Of Reason.' but this Is 
Hlainly concerned to prove tilat reason dooti not COR!iist of syllogistic rea!H)O-
1119.,,46 ,/. 
In othor words. as soo often happens t'liti1 Loei~, his meaning is c.lear 
enoufJ1; he 'has ool'V failed by not carefully delimitIng his words. In both 
accounts. In the early essaj"S and in the EsqaYtsense and reason play the major 
r1:.Jes, with perception of different typos (s(.tnse perception, IntuItion, ete.) 
as an "I n-betW('>.(!tn" facu. ty. The theor i os of knor.'1 ledge in the two \iOrks se«.l 
thon to parallel one another closely. The fo) h:~1ing outline of parallel texts 
lends further evidence to tl conclusion of consistency. 
4'Ster1tng Lamprecht, The Morel !U!!. Pol 'ti~l pp'lloS<?!hx 2! ,lohn Loc;~ 
(New York, 1918), p. 60. 
460ertrand Russell, a !il.story 2f WesterlJ fhi,lo§:9Rh,x (uew York, 1945), p. 
607. 
ESSAY ~ONCERtn Ii! HltWi utmSIAl'.., I t«i 
A. The General Proc:ess: 
All ideas originate from 
sensation or reflection. 
PRlt~V IDEAS (orlgtnel of 
Kn;:M ledge) 
from sensation or reflection 
il) Primary qua) ities (solidity) 2) Secondary It (color. taste) 3) Tertiary II (tn'ler to heat) 
~-"'Whatever the mind thinks on; 
phantasm. spec t as. 
Perception - taking notice of 
Ideas or having Ideas. 
COMPLEX IDEAS 
fanned by the mind through: 
(J) Compound i ng 
(2) RelatIng 
(3) Abst ract , "9 
KNOWLEDGE 
ilpercept i on of the COlll'lOCt i on and 
agreement between ideas." 
a. By Intuition. 
b. By demonstration (I"fl..ason). 
fInds proofs; orders; themj, 
perce I ves agreement etc. 
p • ~/hat reason is: 
lla facy 1 ty of manll 
lie discovery of the cartalnty 
or probability of such propositIons 
wnadl the mind arrived at by deduc-
~ ion. fron such Ideas whieh it has 
qJt ••• by sensation or reflection. II ltv. 18. 2) 
Tile origin of knowledge (at least for 
t.he 1_ of nature) is from sense 
wqlCr i ence. 
PRUtARV NOTIONS (elements for 
k.now I edge) 
from sense experience 
e~Ullmp los: matter. mot ion, 
visible structure of the 
worM. 
..................... 
• .. ti .................. . 
·-but known facts are given to reason, 
SQ1'Ie truth that is given and perceiv~ • 
(C:.A~LEX IDEAS) 
reason works by: "formi n9 and coopos-
i ng new onesll (i .e. images): llarrangi n9 
ImafPS. 
.......... 41 ............ . 
............. ., .... ., ... 
a. • •••••••.•••• 4' ••• 
b. By rooson: fro.11 sense experio.nee. 
a rgoes from one th i n9 to anoth4'l r • 
lithe faculty of arguingll 
lithe discursive faculty which edvEmCC! 
fron things unknown to things f<.nol1n, 
and argues from one thIng to anoth<:n" In 
a definite order of propositions. 1I (p. 
149) 
t. On innate id~a$: 
Book I t Chapter 2 of the Essay 
is devoted to proofs showing 
t~lat we have no innate principles 
or idE~as. 
D. On the knowledge of God: 
We Mve certain knowledge by 
C:1C of'gwoont of our OOIn cont I ngent 
existence. 
E. On the basis of morality: 
l'The idea 0·' a Supreme Being ••• 
whose workmansh I p \"Ie ara • • .; 
~nd the Idea of ourselves, as 
understanding. rational beings, 
• • • tlould ••• afford suc.h 
foundations of our duty and rules 
of action ••• " (IV. 3, IS) 
f. On the demonstrab tIl ty of 
morality: 
"I doubt not. but from self" 
evident principles. by necessary 
consequences, as Incontestable as 
those In mathemat i cs, the measure 
of right end wrong might be 'made 
out." (tV. 3, IS). 
37 
lilt has bean only an empty 
assert ion, th&t the souls of ,lleO 
when they ~a4e born are soo'letiling l'llvr 
than e:,;pty tablets capable of receiv 
ing all sorts of imprints b1Jt having 
nO:lC stcupcd on ttlom by natul*e. u (p. 
137) 
We have certain k~ledge by the 
argl.lnent fran des i 9n. 
The burden of the whole series of 
essays Is to prove that because God 
exists and we are subject to Him, we 
therefore are bound by the natural 
law placed over us • 
Hln fact it seems to me to follow 
Just as necessarily from the nature 
of man that, if he is man, he is 
bound • • • to observe the law of 
nature, as it follows from the natur 
of a trian~Je that, if It Is a 
triangle, Its three angles ere equal 
to two right angles." (p. 199) 
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Earlier It \<Jas noted that two important problems must be dealt with regard ... 
ing the consistency of the eptstem::>logy contained in the Essay! .2! !h! ~ .2.f 
Uature and the E.!saX ConelilrnJ!!fJ t!uman Understanding. The fl rst problel'l'I con-
~erned the use of the term llreasonll j the second problem before us now Involves 
o comparison of texts which 1$ not at all favorable to a verdict of consistency 
in favor of Locke. The canparlson looks to Lockets views on the extent of 
human knowledge. 
G. On the extent of human knowledge: 
Ilfteason, though it penetrates 
into the depths of the sea and 
earth, elevates our thoughts as 
high as the stars •••. yet it 
comes far short of the real extent 
of even corporeal being; and there 
are many Instances where It fafls 
us. 1i (IV. 17, 9) 
'~ur ignorance is great, ••• 
launch not out Into that abyss of 
darkness ••• out of a presumption 
that noth I n9 t s beyond our compre-
hension. 1I (IV, 13.22) 
"For al' this sort of learning. 
whatever Its extent (and it certain" 
1 y tl8$ made great progress) f 
traverses the whole world. and Is 
not confined within any llmits. 1I 
(p. 12S) 
liAs loog as these two faculties 
serve one another, ••. there is 
nothing so obscure • • • that the 
mind, capable of everything Q could 
not apprehend it by reflection and 
reason t if supported by these two 
facu 1 ties. II (p. )47) 
locke's statements on the extent of knowledge as totally inconsistent with 
locy,e's mature thought expressed in the EssaX Conccrnins HUlIl8~ Understi?~i,!S. 
For P. G." Lucas had this to say in an erticle for tho f.J11J..;.()sophi.E,al ,g,~!.£!ly.: 
:'But one of the features of tile c!"'seys that strtk~s me (though not Or. von 
".e~!den) ID')st strongly, Is the ~Iete absence of ~ny suggestion of a I Imi-
tation on the combined powers ot rcason and the senses. 'rhe mind that has to 
be presupposed thrQughout the es,5~YS, for the argument: to make sense at. all. is 
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the <nnlum capax anlmus.,,47 Implied in this obJec:tlon is that without a .Ind 
unlimited In Its range. fII8n could never know the natural law; and hence since 
Locke consider. the mind to be quite limited according to the standards of the 
lIllY, man can never know the natural Jaw. LOG"'s own criterion, according to 
Lucas, rules out the posslbi llty of knowing the law of nature. 
The first thing to be noted In this objection i. Hr. Lucas' apparent mis· 
understanding of the phr ... OIIAIUII §:!2!! anllRUs. To say that the soul I. capa-
ble of all things Is not the .... as to NY that man therefor. does comprehend 
all things or even can exhaust the knowledge of aU thln9s. The soul itself Is 
c:apeble of unlimited knowleclge, but It is ,_ned In _tter. Its dependence 
on matter limits Its renge of knowledge. Furthermore. Locke's most explicit 
criterion In the later liMY Justifies the conviction that the 'aw of nature can 
be kaown. Natural law can be known because It conforms to the criterion of 
being "according to .... son,u48 since the Ideas underlying It can be trKed to 
sense experience. But Locke's whole effort .n the early essays wes preclaely 
to shaw that knowledge of the Ntural 1_ could be had since the 'deas were 
traceable to sen$8 eKper' ..... , and that the deduction was natura. and true. 
Moreover. as the previous comparison of text. made clear, Locke believed the 
deduction of moral rules to be as certa'A as tho$e from mathematics. He 
47p• G. Lucas, "Discussion: John Locke," I!a philosophical Quarterlx. VI 
(April. 1956). 176. 
48'n IV. 17. 23, Locke dIstInguishes between things that are according to 
reason. above reason, ancl contrary to reasOft. U tAccording to reason' are such 
propoSitions whos. truth we can discover by __ tnlng and tracing tho •• Ideas we 
have from sensation ••• and by rational deduction find to be true or profit-
able. 1t 
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believed this to be true In the Essays .2!l the b- .2! Hasure and In the E!tax 
Congernlns Human !.fmIerstandiRJI. I f Locke Is less confident of human knowledge 
In the later Issax. It Is not In respect to the I., of nature, which he left 
stilI very much within the limits of human ~ledge. 
It would seem, then, thet a eoneluslon of at leest basic consistency be-
tween the b«) descriptlOfts of human cognition Is warranted. In both, Innate 
Idees are ruled out; ampl rh:lsm, particularly knowledge frClm sense experleAGe 
Is stressed; the mind works at compounding and c::omperJng In the same way in 
both works; and the mind's power of reasoning with certainty Is noted and 
described In much the s.-ae manner In both. Only the dl fferences in the use of 
the word tlte8lOfttl and the Hmitatlon of the mind', power. called to our atten-
tlOft by Lucas. Indicate any notable deviations. And both of these, we bel ieve 
c:8n be explained In a way tbat 'eaves Intact the COASlstenc:y of Locke's thought 
It stili may be objec.ted thet the deKrlptlon of cognitIon given in the 
!,saYS S!!'!.l!!!. .be g! N,ttu,re Is too fneontplete to allow for any definite proof 
of eons I steney. Th is.. wll I acIm it • About all that I shere J ntendecl I s to 
note that at least no major Inconsistency Is .... rent and that the two de ... 
scrlptlons closely para 1 Ie' each other. 
When this cognition Is pIKed in the context of knowing the natural law. 
and when the statements ora natural law In the .,Iy essays ar. compared to 
remarks ... I n the Ism and I ft the lesaM Imt i Ie .2!!. C I vi J §o!!r'!!!nl. the 
conclusion of consistency Is even more justified. It has been the source of 
speculation that Locke did not feel that he eould .... sonably justify a system 0 
morals based on the lew of nature, or that the leenness of his treatment of 
natura. I.., In the Essey Indicates a lack of confidence In tbe concept or even 
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a rejeetlon of It. Such speculation tIIo8y be profitable. What Is far more 
valuable. however, Is to GOnsle"r what Locke ac:tually did say. His remarks on 
the law of nature in the I!HY. It Is true, are very meager--meager enough to 
fA:=a.;:::;::s;..:r.. Iac:k of conviction in the law. But his statements, I f carefully 
considered, reveal Just as strong a conviction as the eHays 2!! !!:!! !d!! 2! 
ture displayed, plus a ..... rkilble consistency with those early essays. 
Locke's Second Imtll! 2! Slvl! §2verment, In whlGb the law of nature Is made 
the beals of his political theory, mani fests the ... c:onsisteftGy. Only one 
real problem ,resents itM.f 1ft this section, the opinion that Locke leaned more 
tON81'ds • hedonlst1c doctrine than to a morality rooted In the law of nature. 
The suspiCion _y arise thet only those passages which support a foregone 
hilton of consistency haW! been chosen from the I'HY. To avoid this, 
very ,.,sage 49 referring to the natural law in the ISHY twas Men Included In 
he comparison given below. plus several other Jmportaftt statements referring to 
Unfortunately, Locke makes no attempt to prove a natura' law or how 
It i, known in his few statements on the law of nature and mora1lty. But his 
tatelllents do Indicate, In places. the nature and basis of such a proof. 
I 
• On knowled90 of the law of nature: 
"There Is a great deal of dlffer-
ACe between an I nnat. law and a law 
f nature; between something Imprinted 
our minds In this very orig, .. 1, 
ESSAY! RH !HI LAW OF MATya' 
liThe purpose of the second essay Is 
to prove Just this: that the law of 
nature can be known by the II ght of 
nature. tLl gilt of nature' I s used in 
4\very pessage except one wh J ch Is SORteWhatt I rre 1 evant. I t occurs 'n I • 
• 6, where Locke grants ''that. great part of mankInd gIve testimony to the taw 
f .... ture. 1I but he argues that this does not ,rove that the law of nature Is in'" 
te. 
and somethIng that we, being Ignorant 
of, may attain to the knowledge of by 
the use and due application of our 
natural faculties. And I think, they 
equally forsake the truth who ••• 
either affirm an Innate 1_. or deny 
th41t there I s a law knowable by the 
light of nature. 1I (I, 3. 13) 
t'torallty e".ble of Demonstration--
The tCiU of a Su,reme Being ••• on 
wholD we depend; and the Idee of our-
selves, as understancUng, rational 
belnp ••• would ••• afford such 
a foundation of our duty and rules of 
action, a. IIlght ,1ace morality 
IIIOftglt the sciences capable of demon-
stratlon." (tv, 3, 18) 
8. Thet there Is a 1_ of nature: 
"That God ha$ given. rule where-
by man ahould govern hlaself. no one 
Is 10 brut ash as to cIeny. u 8ec:ause 
He has the rIght to subject u. a. 
creatures, the wisdom to direct us, 
end the power to enforce 1_. (t I J 28. 
S) 
c. Certainty of the moral 1_: 
"Korat ,rlner,I. require .... sonlng 
and discourse, and some exercise of the 
mind In order to discover the certainty 
of their truth •••• It Is our own 
fau I t I f we come not to a carta I n know-
ledge of them. If (t J 3, I) 
t. lAw of Nature not easi Iy known: 
it • • • the i porence where I n _ny 
men are of them (I.e. mor81 rules.)" 
(I, 3, 1) ''Heft<:e naturally flows the 
great varIety of o,lnlons concerning 
the moral rules. 1I (t. 3, 6) 
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the same context also: "by saying 
something can be known by the light 0 
nature we mean •.• men can attain 
It ••• If he MkeS proper use of 
his faculties." (p. 123) 
The two premises. a Supreme BeIng 
over us, and ourselves a. rational, 
.... precIsely the foundatiOftS used in 
Locke's argument for proving the law 
of nature; Itl_son can lead us to th 
knowledge of a l_ker or &onIe su-
perior pawer to whtc:h we are neturall 
subject.u ••• "Partly we can infer 
a definite rule of our duty from man' 
• • • f.cult les. 1I (p. 155) 
Coafer the basic ar ..... t of the 
fourth essay: "there must be a PfA'ler-
fu 1 artICf wi.. creator • • • " And I f 
this Is so, It follows that IlHe has 
not created the world for nothing and 
without purpose." From thJs and ft 
a realization of our CMn faculties I 
can lafer a definite rule of our duty I 
(p. 157) 
After distinguishIng the law of 
nature and positive divIne taw. Locke 
says: liThe fonner we know with 
certainty by the II gilt of Mture and 
from rational prlnclples. 1I (,. 189) 
HI f In ordinary 11 fe men .eldon 
de 1 va I nto the i r purpose I n 11 fa. • • 
« it. s not to be wondered at thetaf 
nature men's opinions are so differ-
ent." (p. 135) 
• Actual practice follows the I_ 
of fashion: 
If • • • the greatest part of men 
shall find to govern themlelves 
hlefly, if not solely by the Jaw of 
feshloni and, so they do that which 
ps them In reputation with theIr 
tcorapany, J ittl. regarct the laws of 
, or mag'strate." (II, 28, 12) 
"For most peop'e are Ii tt Ie con-
cemad about their duty; they are 
guided not so much by reason as either 
by the example of others or by tra-
ditional customs and the fashion of 
the eount ry. H (p. J 35) 
There remains. however, one crucial problem and apperent conflict in Locket 
heory which is left untouched by the parallel t~ts. Is the natural law the 
Iy, or even the prImary, basis of morality for Locke? That It Is would seem 
lmost Incontestable after Locke remarks that "this (natural law) Is the only 
rue touchstone of moral rectltude.uSO And yet we read In Thllly's COIIftentary 
Locke's ethics an almost diametrically opposite conclusion: "Locke offers an 
I rlcal theory of ethics, Which ends In egoistic hedonlsm. IIS1 The fact that 
ocke has frequently mentioned the I .. of nature ancf God's wi I J In respect to 
,.Ilty, only modIfIes the conclusion mildly: ''TIll. (Locke IS theory) is the 
ld Greek Hedonistic InterpretatIon of morality, supl1emented by a narrow con'" 
tlon of Christi." theology.1I52 
Nor Is Thilly alone In hls,lnterpretation. Others, though not statIng It 
utte so strongly, conclude that Locke counters natural law with hedonlSlft In his 
thles. S3 If theIr conclusiOllS are correct, then .. certainly have an almost 
SO 8 a !ntsax, II, 2, • 
S1Frank Thllty, A Histo£r if Phi J0!2!hX (New York, 1914), p. 322. 
521b1d• 
Slrhls Interpretation of hedonism in much of Locke's ethics Is given by 
• R. Morris In Lsike. 8erke.el' Hums (Oxford, 1930). by W. T. Jones In A 
Istor .2! Wester'! r.hU~iNewYork. 19S2). and in a IDOdlfied way by Sterl-
ing Lamprecht In The Mora and Political Philos of John Locke New York I I 
incredible IIlncongruitytl In the doctrine of II llan who argued vigorously in his 
early essays that manls self-Interest is not the baSis of natural law. 54 
The hedonistic laterpretation of Locke Is clr."" principally from an 
unusual description Locke gave to "good" and Hevll". In look II, chapter 20 
of the IsHY he states quite frankly: "Things then are good or evil only In 
ref.~ to pleaaure or pein. That we call 'good' which Is apt to cause or 
Increase pleasure, or diminish pain In us; ••• and on the contrary, we ..... 
that 'evll t which Is apt to produce or Increase any pain, or clJl8lnlsh any 
pleasure In us.uSS When we reed that things are good or evil in reference to 
pleaaure or pain, It Is not surprlslAt to find Interpreted conclusions such as 
this: ·tyhe question arlMS, how did such moral , .. ever come to be estebllshecl t 
haw hal the knowledge of right and wrong been acquired? Pleasure aDd pain ar. 
the gr.at teachers of morality accordlns to our .. lrlclst_,,56 PI.aure and 
pain, then, mark off what is good or evil, and the ... of nature really has 
very I ittl. practical bearIng. 
II th'l the theory Locke Intends? Flrlt, it could be argued that no one 
who has 10 conSistently stressed one Idea. such .. the natural law 8. the true 
norm of RIOr.lIty, will suddenly rever .. hll field $0 Inexplicably. But there 
also ..... to be sufflcient evhlenee In his own tIItONS to warrant « more con .. 
slstent statement of hIs cIoctrlne. The cUfflGUhy appears to •• e less with 
Locke's thought than In his broad and rather _'guous use of tams. The 
S4,S!!XI. pp. 205-21S. 
SS!! EstlX. II. 20, 2. 
>'rhilly, p. )23. 
l.,leasureH and "paln", for instance. signify IWhatsoever delight or uneasiness 
1$ felt by us. 1I57 Furthermore, one or other of them "Join thellftselvos to al-
most all our Ideas both of sensation and reflect ion. 1158 But it Is God who has 
effected this fixing of pI_sura and pain onto ideas In order to fIOtivate us. 59 
Nowhere. h<:Mever, does Locke state or even suggest that we should JudI! 
the goodness or evil of aGts by the pleasure or pain they bring, which Is what 
ThfUyand others idlply. Nowhere does Locke say that It is pleasure and puin 
whh:.h cause or determine a thing to be called good or bad. In faot, if we 
read Locke carefully, we flnct thlt he states the exaot opposite. HPleasure 
and ,.In, and that which CMlH' them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our 
passions turn.u60 
In other words, ... ac:t, an object. or 8ft idea Is objectively good or evil. 
And depending Oft which It Is, It.1I 1 result In pleasure or pain. But with 
this allgMI8At •• norm Is stili needed to .t ....... what is objectively ggocI or 
ba4. That aorra Locke hils al .... dy noted--natura} 'a. Reason would stili re-
tain Its function of cHsc:overfng the prlncl, ... to be used in mora. Judpllmts. 
All that has been added Is the fact that ,I.sure and pain weigh heavily in the 
fIOtivatton of HC'. NacI Locke only introduced or made Il10'. ex,llcit one idee 
fn his natural 1_ theory. this .... rent conflict would not have arlsGn or at 
least would not have loomed so lar,.. The Idea which he left unclarified Is 
57A!1 bux, '" 2.0, 15. 
58,bid., II, 7. 2. 
59'bld •• II, 7, 3. 
60'bld., II, 20. 3. 
that of man's ultImate end, happiness. ThIs OIIllsslon, we shall see later. Is 
the major weakness In Locke's ar ... nt for the vel idlty of the law of nature. 
If Locke's natural law doctrine demands that man act out of the sheer, un-
selfish motive of servl", God's glory, while his treatment of good end evil 
shows men egotistically motIvated by pleasure and pein elone. we do Indeed 
sense en tACOn$lstency In ht, thinkIng. But the two e.Kplenatlons can be 
synthe,tacl end probably were joIned In Locke's mind, though he failed to 
expre., It cl .. rly. Manl, happiness or pleasure and God's glory ere not 
oppoMCI to each other. In serving God's glory, we achieve happIness. 8y 
followl", God'. will as exprelsed In the nature' 1_. \118 glorify Him and brins 
happi_s to ourselves. J. V. Gough concurs that this Is Locke's true mind. 
"But the way to get happiness. (ac:c:or4lng to Locke) was to obey the will of 
God.·,61 
Locke himself __ s this clear when he returns to the subject of morality 
In Book I •• 28, 5. "Moret gaod and evil t thea, Is only the conformity or dis-
ag ..... nt of our voluntary actions to some I." whereby good end evil Is drawn 
on us from the will end powr of the l .... ker, which good end evil, pleasure or 
peln, attendS ... our obse~ or breach of the '., by the decree of the law-
maker, II that which we Mil -reward' end 'punishment , • .,62 
I t seems then that we can cone 1 ude thet Locke' 5 genera 18th I cal theory is 
consiltent. This does not __ that It's ''one, hennonlous whole," which, wit 
6,.1. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Phllos9P!!Y, (Oxford, 1950), p. 8 
62 !n IssaX, II, 28, 5. 
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Lanprecht, we admit Is not the case.63 Locke's words are too ambiguous, his 
synthesis too Incomplete, to conclude to perfeet unity_ But, as has been 
mentioned before, It is hIs basic thought that concerns us, and as Gough wisely 
notes, lias generally with Locke, we shan miss the point If we Insist too much 
on verbal mlnutlae. lI64 
Not only do statements on the law of nature In the Essay shQ1 a remarkable 
consistency with the fuller enunciations of the I.- In the early essays, but 
this consistency remains, moreover, when we pess over to Loeke's .l~ Treatls. 
2!! ,'vll Gov.rmen~. In this famous treetise Loeke made the natural 1_ and 
a state of nature the foundatfons of his political theory. Bec:ause of the 
weak att.,t In the liMY to show how the 1_ of Mtur. Is known, and since no 
effort Is made In that regard In the treatise Itself. the ,., of nature was 
adjudged to be a fl.-.t of Locke's I_ginatlon totally Inconsistent with his 
epistemology_ 
In the light of the essays recently published, such a claim ean hardly be 
defended. In the eslays, knowledge of the law of nature Is clearly fonnulateel 
That the law of nature di&cussed In the eSMYI does not differ from that pre-
"Ateet tn the T .... tl .. should be evident In the comparIson which follows. The 
pun,.. In whlGh the I., of nature Is mentaoned In the Treatise are too numer-
ous to list theM ell. but the .ssentlal ones wll 1 be noted. 
Locke's ffrlt Treati!! !!!!. Civil l<r!!rment offered a refutation of Sir 
Robert Filmer's clivi. right principles. The J.!en4 Treatise. with which we 
--------
63Sterllng lAmprecht, 1he Koral !!!! PoUtig) Phl1osop1:!X 2.f John !r.<x:ke 
(New York, 1918), p. 103. 
64 Gough, p. 23. 
lare deal ing--tho law of nature. Tho following out) Joe indicates the con-
sistenc:y of the texts from the Trea$i5El; as compared with the texts from the 
~rly essays. 
lECQJ!{ TRlAT t SE Qfi GQViRtliE~5 
~. The natural law: Its force, its 
basis, its precepts: 
arhe state of nature has a law of 
Inature to govern it, which obi iges 
!everyonei t and reasonii which Is that 
law, teaches a 11 men who w III but 
iCOnsu I tit.. that be i ng ali equa J and 
In~nt, no one ought to harm 
~notheriti In his life. health. 
liberty or possessIons." (I" 2, i) 
... B • IIReeson. II in th I s context 
poviously refers not to the faculty 
!but to principles to be ~sulted. 
~his usage is noted In the early 
!essays on page III t though it. siess 
frequently used. 
~. Certainty concerning the Jaw; 
Locke tells us that it Is beyond his 
purpose to study particulars of the law 
lef nature but that: lilt is certainiv 
there Is such .. law, and ttNtt too, as 
intelligible and plainv to a rational 
creature and • studler of that law as 
the pos I t I VG laws of COllIDO ..... th, M)' 
possibly plainer." (lit 2. 12.) 
I) f JHenee no one can doubt that 
this law is binding on all human 
beings. 1I (p. 2.11) 
i i) After referring to right reason t 
Locke says: liB), reason, I do not 
think Ir. moant here that faculty of 
undGrstanding ••• but certain 
defInite principles of action." 
(p. lit) 
III) l'1'he ,.., of nature altogether 
forbids us to offend or Injure any 
private person without cause. 1i 
(p. 1(3) 
Iv) The law ot nature ICWe kncM with 
certainty by the light of nature 
and from rad 008 i pri ncl p J fbS. II 
(p. 189) 
v) l'Though, no doubt, it is oot 
made k\~ in the same way as 
pos'tl\~ l~i5_ It is sufficiently 
k~'In to man," (p. 113) and at 
tlllleS "50 mcmlfest and c:ertein that 
nothing can 00 plainer." (p. 2(1) 
65o.uotations from John L.ocke, .l)2 Treati!!!, 2!! Clv' t §2verl1OO...!lt. ed. W. S. 
Carpenter (London, 1924). 
C .. Necessary that It be promulgated: 
"For nobody can be under a 1_ 
that is not promulgated to him; and 
this law being promulgated or made 
known by reason on I y • • • u 
(II, S, 17) 
i. God Is Its promulgator and author: 
The rules, I.e., of men's actions, 
st "be conformable to the law of 
natu.... I.e. to the will of God, of 
ich that's. ckclaratlon. H 
(II, ... 135) 
E. The I., Is eternal and universal: 
''I'hus the law of nature stands as 
~ eternal rule to all men.1I (II. II, 
13S) 
• Civil laws based on It: 
"The munlelpa' 1.,. of countries, 
feh are only so far right as they 
re founded on the I., of nature, by 
hlch they are to be regulated and 
Interpreted." (II, 2, 12) 
• two fundamental precepts: 
"Everyone as he I s bound to pre-
rye himself, and not to quit his 
tation Wilfully, ••• so by the 
11 Ice reason • • • ought he as much 
s he can to ,reserve the rest of 
nklnd. 1I (II, 2, 6) 
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"He must know beforehand that there 
is a lawmakeru and that "there Is 
some will on the part of that su-
perior power with respect to things 
to be done by us. 1I (p. 151) 
''For God, the author of this law. 
has willed It to be the rule of our 
moral life. and He has made It suf-
ficiently known. 1I (p. 187) 
The seventh essay Is entitled end 
treats of: Ills the Binding Force of 
the 18I of Nature Perpetual and 
Universe1?1i Locke answers" uYes. 1I 
(p. 191) 
I~ of civil magistrates derIve 
their whole force from the contain-
Ing power of natural law. 1I (p. 189) 
Man feels himsel f Impelled: lito 
be prepared for the me I ntenance of 
soc I ety • • • in fact as much as he 
Is obliged to preserve himself.1i 
(p. 157) 
In the course of both the essays and the S~ Treatise, several other 
recepts of the I., of nature are mentioned. They vary somewhat. In the 
ssa s ga the .Ir.e! S!! Natu,re, for Instance, precepts regarding the worship of 
, self-preservation, mocIesty, friendship, justice and others are called to 
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attentIon. In the Second Treetlse precepts on self"preservatlon. and particu-
larly precepts on justice are Injec:ted. In SOfil0 cases the precepts overlap. 
aut nowhere do they openly confHct with each other, so that we can pass over 
them without too much C(..)ncern. 
Fragnentary as all these ideas may be, they mesh well wIth what Loc.ke has 
told us previously about the law of nature. ThrO'.Jghout the three works In-
vest I gated, Locke '5 concept t on of the 1 lAW of nature and how itt s known reme i ns 
consistent. 
Conclusion. According to many commentators, inconsIstency is Locke's 
trademark. They say that between the doctrine of the fl rst three books of his 
Essay and the fourth book lies a gaping inconsistency. His empJ rical episte'" 
mology and his rationalist pol itlce) theory are so divergent. we are told, that 
they might well be cited as opposed doctrines. But a closer analYSis of Locke 
tllOUght. an analysis that looks less to trapping him on a strict comparison of 
words, and more to perceiving the genera. trains of his thought, wI} J reveal a 
sooaewhat smoother theory of cognition and morality. Richard Aaron, without 
wrenching or distorting Lockels thought. has shoNn how such a sympathetic 
analysis can be made of his epistemology. 
Locke's treatment of the law of nature Is less difficult to reconcile. 
The same leading thoughts and COf'lvletions carry through each of the three works 
studies In thfs thesis. It may be argued, and Justly, that Lockels treatment 
is very Inadequate and that a fuller analysis on his part might have involved 
him In Innumerable difficulties. This is quite true. All we have Is a 
thread of his thought. But It Is equally evident that this thread runs 
through his entire theory, a consistent thought and conviction. It seems at 
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times ['lOre a belief than a reasoned doctrine, but at least it is a belief un-
shaken by his method of critical analysis which devastated luan't another strong-
hold. 
There is a law of nature and reason, I imited though It may be. can kriowit 
\'Ihoo it works fron sense experience. 
CHAPTER IV 
ARE LOCKE! S ARGiJ-tElfl"S FOR KNa\lLEOGE 
(IF THE t4ATURAL LAW VALID? 
This thesis contains a dual problem: c:onsisteney and validity. Locke, of 
course, had only the tatter one In mind. He detennined to prove that there is 
a law of nature binding on Dll men which can be naturally known. His argument, 
unfortunately, rembles over '.l3ny pages, treatins first one aspect and then an'" 
other. Worse yet, his words and develo~~t of proof woefully lack precision 
and c:onelseness. These facts leave the door wide open for interpretations of 
his thought which ean very much affect the val hUty of his proofs. Here pre-
cisely lies the difficulty in evaluating Locke·s ar~aent. If the apparently 
iI~cepted!l InterpretaUoal of Locke's ar91..1l'llf.IDt by Dr. von Leyden is adil1itted. 
then the crIticisms made would seem to be true and Locke's proof is simply in-
valid. But Is von Leyden *$ Interpretat ion (;.OJ~rect? And if not, can an antdy-
sis of locke's arguments be f'ilQde which wi 11 ~llOnstrate the val idity of his 
ar9~nts1 
locke's arguments. fortunately, can be arraw.Jed for either interpretation, 
von Leyden's or one more favorable to Locke, into a four-fold division which 
matches the four-fold criticism made by von Leyden. The procedure then, after 
an initial, overall dIscussion of the two interpretations of Locke, will be to 
consider each stage of the two interpretations and to evaluate locke's proofs hi 
the light of both. 
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first, then, von Leyden's overall suamary of Locke's reasoning should be 
noted: 
The I ioo of my enqul ry \'Ii JJ follow what i take to be the 'ogical 
steps of his argument. They are briefly these: Locl<.e passes from the 
factual statement that man possesses reason to the conclusion that reason 
is his essential characteristic, and hence to the assumption that reason 
leads to the discovery of mora' truths. and if properly employed, to the 
discovery of one and the sane set of roora) truths, i.e. natural law. 
Fran this he Is led to infer ethical assertions to the .ffect that the 
mora' standards discovered by reason are thenselvos rational and that they 
are c:Cl1lJlands bind i Rg on a 11 men. and hen<:e to the assort i on that the 
validity of such COO1i'l&flds can be proved, and even S£lOl'll1 to be nocessary in 
the 6eJIe way as a geometrleaJ demonstration. l 
Von Leyden then criticizes L.ocf<e In this argl.lllent for making ~rranted 
leaps between different planes of kl'kMledge. Locke, he ny5, failed to dis'" 
~in9uish between four different types of propositions: (I) factual statements; 
(2) statements concerning the operation of reason; (3) ethical assertions; 
(4) logIcal truths. If Locke and other exponents of the nature' Jaw llhad sort ... 
~ out the various statements ImpliCit In their doctrine and had noted thet "it 
s not eheys possible to pass f~11 one statement to another t thei r argt,lnents 
flight well have lost the conviction which they have carried throughout the 
~ges.u2 \Ion Leyden Is particularly c:oneerned with the attempt to pess from 
lratters of feet. or non-ethical statements, to ethical conclusions. 
VOR Leyden's position. then. is th.s: locke argues that man Is rationel; 
sing reason leads to moral truths; these truths .:lre thansolves rational; they 
re binding, they are universally true. The emphasis Hes on the fact that ~3n 
s rational. Man is rational; therefore. man ought to act rationally. There 
S4 
are moral truths; therefore. they ought to be followed. It is this sort of 
transition fron IIls" to "ought" that von leyden sees as particularly invalid. 
But such an interpretation as this misses tho point of the argu.11ent, and 
does not account for the true origin of obI i get ion.. Von leyden has man per" 
celvlng that he is rational, looldng for rules by which to guide himself. find .. 
ing the natural law. seeing that It befits him, end concluding ti1et it must 
obi 1ge him. 
Locke, however, seems rather to focus on God's existence as a fat/giver. 
rrhe Jaw and Its existence arise pr'_rily from the fact that God, the creator, 
eJtists and governs all things with a purpose. In fact, once we have arrived at 
the conclusion that there Is e God who h~ the author of all things, lithe notion 
F;>f a universal law of nature binding on all men necessari Iy emerges. il3 Von 
I\'oweyden stresses mants raUonal ity; Locke seems rather to center on God's ex'" 
Istence as a lawgiver and all -wIse Creator. Von Leyden has Locke arguIng fr~n 
:nan's ratIonality through his discovery of moral truths and on to thei r binding 
force and validtty. A more exact Interpretation, 8S the examlnatfon of the 
texts WhIch follows should beer out, would have locke 9J;ng from God's overali 
~vernance of the world, to man l , participation in this Qrder by means of the 
law of nature. The law. in turn, obI iges men beeeose they recognize It as 
~uthored by God. 
Hence, if we fonaw the central nne of LocI(O's thought. not worrying too 
much about his vagueness or ineptness at clear expression. \ie wi 11 find a sub-
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stantlal1y val id argument. If the text of Locke's ossays is earefully studied 
a thread af argument far more consistent than von Leyden has indicated reveals 
itself. 
In proving that the low of natu~ can be tc.oowo as man's rule end guiOc. 
and the ",., i s of a 11 I aw and ll'lOra I i ty. Locke fee I s that: it i Ii necessary to 
danonstrate four things: the existence of the law of Mture; its knowebi I ity. 
shCMlng that It has been promulgated; Its binding force. and its perpetuity 
and universality. As a result, his ar~nents fall into four dlvisions f al-
though Locke did not d i st 'ngu hHi them as such ~ 
t) A proof that there is a law of nElture{Es~ys: , &. II). 
II ) A proof that tl1 i 5 I aw can be known by us (f: ssay I V) • 
III) A proof that the lat~ Is binding on all men (Essay vI)" 
IV) It proof that It is perpetual and universal (Essey VII). 
This four-fold division corresponds to von teyden's divisIon of Locke's 
argument into the four type! of propositions usect. 
n I n the open 1"9 Essay, lQc'.ke offers hi s proofs for the ex is tence of e 
h~f of nature. Actually his e,.~nts on this one point ere repeated In 
various places. What we believe Is Locke's central argument reappears in 
several places In the initial essays: in the introductory paragraph of the 
fi rst essay. in the fi rst and thi rd erg&MDents in that essay, and again In the 
last section of the second essay. 
Von Leyden In his first criticism, after discussing locke's ambiguous use 
of the word ~'reason:'. and aftor deal ing wIth the fot"lTlal proofs presented by 
L,ocke, eoneludes b}' noting: ''rhus far. then. Locke's starting point is simple: 
~. it consists in tho factual statement that man can reason. iI 
Nere the C',:mtent Ion begins. Is this locke's starting point? 
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Von leyden 
evidently ca.71e to this conclusion after analYZing locko'S first pro;)f if. ESSD~f 
I. In that proof, locke drm'1$ from Aristotle an arg'.mlCnt that lithe special 
function of man is to exercise his :l1ind's facuities in accordance with rationc:d 
princlPles. IIS Aristotle. locke n.:>tas, has shcMt/n by various examplos that there 
Is a special sort of work each thing is designed to perform. and "in the end 00 
rightly concludes that the proper function of man Is acting in conforiflity with 
reason, so mucn so that man must of necessity perfor,n \'\Illat reason prescr!bes. lI1S 
From this initial arguraent y,::>n leyden evidently arrrivaci at his conclusion 
that Loeko's starting poillt is Hman can reasonH and that ilmoreovcr. it Is frolll a 
merely factual statement conet~rnin9 man's essential nature that the moral propo-
sition is Inferred that he has a duty to i ivc. in CO\lTOrmlty with this nature. il7 
Unfortunately, thls initial argument of Locke's, which is far f.-OOI being his 
best, seems to be the foundation for v<)n leyden's whole interpretation of Locko 
in these essays. So much so. that von leyden wi II later interpret locke as 
saying: "God·s purp;,Jse in erecting man was the',; he should live according to 
8 
reason. II Of course, locke must share the Mane because he leaves the concept 
4Essaxs, p. 46. Von leyden1s introduction eoos on page 95. References 
to pages under HlO should be attributed to von Leyden; over page )00 should be 
attributed to locke. 
511~;lId 
.s.2.!.:::.' • 
6 lbid • 
-
7 Ibid. f 
p. Ii 3 • 
p. 46. 
8!bid •• p. 30. 
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~f the final end or gt'Hili of ffir'3n insufficiently e'l(pJained. This, as will be 
But it stU i 
:lOOS not justify von leyden's wrong interpretation. 
To return, however, to t!w starting point of LlXke'S ~r9u\,lent. Von Leyden 
says it is simply IIman can rcason." Be overlooks, howev..ar t a very important, 
long introductory paragraph of the fi rst essay_ The paragraph treats God IS 
axhtence and rlis governing power as manifest in the world. VOI1 Leyden may 
lave considered this merely a prelude to Locke·s Ulought, but in fact. it con'" 
!'ains the heart of his proof. The whole discussion 00 reason presupposes this 
ntoll igel1tly regulated world spoken of in Lockets vory first words: 
Since God shows tii,l'IS lef to us as present ever)l\'IIhere • • . t I aSSU!1.le 
there will be no one to deny the existence of God •••• This thon being 
taken for granted, and it would be wrong to doubt it, namely. that SOTle 
divine being presides over the Irrorld ..... for it Is by \-tis order that the 
heavens revolve in unhroken rotation ••• and there is flOthing so unstable 
so uncertain. tn thIs whole constitution of things as not to have a rule 
appropriate to its nature--it seems just therefore to inquire whether inan 
alone has come into the world altogether ex~apt from any taw applicable to 
himsel f.9 
Nearly all the major st(;PS In ilis argument, later to be amplified, arc con-
~ained here in germ. God oxists; He presides over the world; all phYSical 
~ture has its laws, • 10 it would seem, also has h.s law. locke will argue 
9. bid., p. i 09 • 
l00nce locke concludes to the existence of a \-lise Creator, he should n"l.ll1:.e 
he trans i t Ion f as he does in the fou rth essay. that a wise C reato,- cannot act 
rlithout purpose. This impiles that God intends bot;, an ultimate end for aii 
n I ngs. and the means or I aws by wh i eil these til i figs may reach the 1 r end. lian is 
fie I tided. God had a speC! nc purpose in crcat ing lilm, and hence Jaws to tluide 
h i.'1 to that end. 
Out locke is not a h~ays So e)tp'l i ci t, as i 5 the case here. where he see:ns to 
ile arguing that. only bocaust;;o all otoor thi;'gs act according to definite laws, 
nan should also. 
that. since God does nothing t'fitho;.!t e purpose, man must c)lso be included in 
God1s design and laws. 
Locke, then, would seen to be arguing Itby descent" from God's governance to 
man's discovery of how he is governed. Von Leyden has Locke arguing "by as-
cent ll from manls discovery and the usc of his reason to finding himself under 
laws. Only with this introductory paragraph as 8 p~lse do we have the proper 
context and meaning of locke's arguments, particularly for this first disputed 
proof. The cone Jus t on noted by von leyden that lithe mora 1 propos It' on is i n-
ferred that he has II duty to Ii vo In conform I ty with tM 5 nsturoll1J is indeed 
made by Locke. But the Inference Is not fr01l I'man Is rational," to 'man must 
act rationally,li but rather from ''man is designed to act according to his nature 
for a necessary purpose," to uman must act rationally.1I At this precise point 
the transition from "lsI! to "ought" Is legitimate, where the absolute moral 
necessity of the end Is conditioned by the moral acts leading to the end. In 
support of the position that this latter inference is the one Locke really had 
In mind, the following facts can be noted: 
n The third argument in this ftrst essay develops from God's overall 
design in the world to man's participation in this design or law. Thus In at 
least one other proof the order follows that of the latter pos it ion mentioned 
above. In this third argument" Locke argues from the constitution of the woric 
Itwherein all thi ng' observe a fixed law of thei r ope rat ions and a manner of 
12 
existence appropriate to thei r nature.!1 All thi "gs created, Locke tells us, 
11 ~ss,axs. p. 46. 
12 Ibid:... p. 117. 
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~re subject to God's Jaw, so that It would not seem that man alone Is Independ-
~nt while all else is bound.. For it does not befit a wise Creator that he 
.hould form an animal endowed Babove al i others with mind. intellect, reason, 
_nd all the requisites for WOrking,lil) and then have no purpose in mind for him, 
~thin9 for him to achieve. 
2) In the disputed argument derived fron Ari&tot;le. the fact that .Ithe 
special function of man is the active exercise of the mind's facultlesu14 foUow 
'the preceding passages (In which) he had stl<X"In by various examples that ti1ere 
is a special sort of work eaeh thing is designed to perform. 1I15 tn the light 
of Locke's opening paragraph, this "designed to performil certainly refers to the 
notion that God has created all things for a necessary purpose or goal, which 
necessity gIves rise to the ethical obI igatloo. 
3) But a stronger and almost irrefutable proof that the inference Locke 
Intends Is from God's law to man's participation through his use of reason, is 
found In a particularly algniflcant remark found in the seGOnd essay. After ra 
stating his argument, this time In terms of how the natural law fs known. Loeke 
says: 
• declared that the foundation of all knowledge of it (i .e., the law of 
nature) Is derived from those things which we perceive through our senses. 
From these things, then, reason and the power of arguing, which are both 
distinctive marks of man, advance to the notion of the maker of these 
things .... and at last they conclude and csleb) ish for themselves as 
certain that some Deity Is the author of all these things. 
13!~!!t. 
141b1d., ,. 113. 
-
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But then Locke cont i nues: 
As soon as this Is laid dawn, the notion of a universal law of nature 
bl"11n9 on 191 i men necessar.ly emerges, and this wi 11 become clear later 
on. 
What does the l!!l!. refer to in the phrase ilas soon as this I s laid down"'? 
I t can on 1 y refer to the fact that "God I s the author of a It th I ngs. II Haw th is 
Inference Is made. locke tells us, ''will become clear later on," referring to 
the argument of the fourth essay. To that argument we can turn our attention 
now • 
• 1) The argument of the fourth essay falls into von leyden's second cate-
gory of critlclsm. concerning statements about the operation of reason. Most 
bf von Leyden's discussion covers points referring to locke'S arguments against 
the origl n of the knowledge of moral rules from innate ideas, tradi tion. or from 
the consensus of mankind. But towards the conclusion of this section von leyda 
takes up the fourth essay. indicating rather accurately this tln~ the course of 
Locke's proof. Von Leyden withholds his criticism for the most pert until the 
next sect Ion. 
tn Essay IV. locke first discusses why reason and sense experience must war 
together to discover the natural law. Then fn order to know .2 sense experien e 
and reason can lead us to the knowledge of the natural law "cartal n feets must 
first be set forth. because they ere necessarily presupposed in the knowledge of 
any and every law. 1I17 
l6'bld., p. 133. 
17'bld •• p. 151. 
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First, In order that anyone may understand that he Is bound by a law, 
he must know beforehand that there is a law-maker. i.e •• some superior 
power to which he Is rightly subject. Secondly, it is also necessary to 
know that there Is some will on the pert of that superior power with 
respect to the th i ngs to be done by us. that is to say, that the f aw-maker • 
whoever he may prove to be, wishes that we do this but leave off that, and 
denands of us that the conduct of our life should be in accordance with his 
will. In what follows it will become clear what sense experience con-
tributes and what reason does, In order that these tt,1O presuppoisltlons, If 
which are requl red for knowledge of the law of nature. may be known to us. 
Locke takes for granted the l'majC)!·II premise of his syllogism, that these 
~wo condItions are the necessary notes for a law. Put he works at length to 
prove that these condi t ions are ful fil led in respect to the natural law. After 
~~in9 how we discover the regularity and art of the world, and especially the 
peeul iar enda.nents of man, we arrive at a conclusion that lither. must be some 
~uperior power to which we are ri£htJy subJect. lli9 And this was the first thin! 
r.eeded for the knowledge of any law. 
locke's argument cont i noes as he moves on tt' the second cond i t Ion, and Showl 
"hat this superior power (God) has some wi II as to what He wants us to do. The 
argunent moves frQll cause to effeet: We have shown, Locke says, that there 
~.xlsts a powerful creator who h aho wise. Hence, I'K'\ says, 11ft ~ol!ows fl"OOl 
this that lie has not cr~.ated this world for nothing and without purpose.1I20 He 
~Id not create without purpose because to work without a fixed aim Is contrary 
.0 such wisdom; also it can hardly be believed that God wouJd endow man with 
,ucn great faculties and then heve nothing In mind for him to do. "Henee," 
18lbid • 
19'bld •• p. 153. 
20'bld •• 
-
p. 157. 
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Locke concludes, itit was the second of the two things required for the knowled 
of any and every law. 1I21 
Now the problan Is: what Is that "somethlngll L'Ihich God tntends for us to 
do? Here Locke becomes rather weak and vague. $0 far his argument Is vailci~ 
though far from eonplete In filling In detaUs. Regularity and design are ob-
served In the world. but these Indicate a wise and purposeful creator govern .. 
Ing the world; the wisdom and purpose must extentl to all things; therefore 
man Is Included under this governance in a way appropriate to his nature. 
Of course today such. proof would have to be highly refined and tightiy 
ordered, sInce as It stands, Locke would be challenged on almost every state-
ment. Is there regularity? Cannot the world be its own cause and purpose? 
Are the principles presumecl in the argument val id? etc. But at least Locke IS 
reasoning up to thls point Is adequate, up to the point where he Inquires whet 
It .s that God Intends man to do. Here again a teleological explanation Is 
catled for, but Locke mixes the beginnings of such an explanation with some 
Inductive observations. 
Locke notes the ultimate end of all things. w.hic.h is Goctts glory.22 
Partly from this and partly from manls faculties, wh;ch must be given for some 
purpose and therefore can and must be used, we infer manls rule and law. The 
implication here Is that man must share In eontrlbu~in9 to God's glory, and 
22, 'But what It is that f s to be done by us can be partl y gathe red from the 
end In view for all things; ••• they appear to be intended by Him for no 
other end than Hii own glory, eb1d to this all tilings must be related. 1I Essa}!s. 
p. 157. 
Locke does not clarify this any farther .. 
63 
~hat this will be done In a way pecul iar to man, suggested by his own endow-
ments. Locke indicates no definite final end for man, but only Indicates that 
in some way he is to use his faculties tOl..rds God's glory. And so locke con-
cludes rather weakly that tnus man IIfeels himself disposed and ready to contem'" 
plate God's works .... and thereupon to render praise •••• Further, he feetJ& 
ihlmself not only to be Impelled by I ife's experience and pressing needs to 
~~u~ and preserve a life In society with other men, but also to be urged to 
~ter Into society by a certain ergeensitX of nature. i623 
But what I f man does not fee I hi mse 1 f so disposed'? What I s he does not 
-
feel impel led to enter into the soelety of men? Locke, of course, may and 
probably does mean something more rational than sneer feeling whleh Impel1s us 
towards the observance of tbe law. But his weakness of expressIon Is Indlea-
tlve of the obscurity In his argllDent. Because Locke has fat led to make claar 
the final end of man. and failed to establ ish It as e qecessarx end. his argu-
~nt here f.l1s short of demonstration. Had Locke shown man's final end to be 
assimilatIon to God. whIch thereby ful ft 115 God '!Ii external glory, and had he 
established the absolute moral necessity of such an end, his argument would rest 
on surer footing. Then the -'things to be done" IndIcated by Locke would be 
seen as necessary means for reaching hIs final end. k.noIIIn by reason and not by 
mere feelings. 
Within such 8 franework. the obligation to obey the natural law would al" 
ready be 'mplled. But obI igatton, to Locke's way of thinking. Is now fully 
established. since the fulfil lment of the two conditions discussed above was 
23 Esaays, p. 157. Italics not In the original. 
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sufficient for man to understand that he is bound by the law of nature. locke 
continues on. nevsrthGless. to make more expl icit the obi igation attached to the 
Jaw of nature. He handles this problell1 in the sixth essay. 
III) It Is here on the proble.'D of obligation that von Leyden raises his 
~st serious objection. Locke, he informs us. at this point makes an illicit. 
transition from factual stat.Dents to ethl~l assert.ions. 
In the lest section It WIllS pointed out that Locke failed to make clear the 
naGeSsary goal of man from which obligation arises. But a more serious in-
Kcuraey of definition involves him in even great., trouble. Von leyden wi 11 
argue that Locke flounders bet.ween two explanations for the source of ob I i gat ion 
a voluntarist theory, and an intellectual ist theory. nelthe", of which is capable 
of assuring binding force. Locke Imp} icates hh1l$G1f in this difficulty by his 
definition or description of natural Jaw early In the first essay: IlHence, this 
law of nature ean be described as being the decree of the divine wi II disccr1:J-
Ible by the light of nature and indicating what Is and what is not in conformity 
~ith rational nature. and for this very reason ~~ing or prohibiting.1l24 
A "decree of God's will ••• Indicating what Is in conformity with ration-
al nature" Is the definition he 'offers. By this definition Locke sets up in 
the disjunction fastened on by von Leyden. And Locl~ does 1 ittle to reconeS te 
24'n this particular In$t~nce the latin text will profit us, especially 
since von Leyden translates the Lattn word ordlnatlo as Ildeereell • slanting the 
translation thereby to an even stronger connotation of something arbitarl1y 
wi lied. 
liiiaec 19ltur lox natur. Ita deserlbi potest quod sit ordlnatlo voluntatis 
dlvinae lumlne naturae cognosclbl1 is, quid em natura ratlonall conveniens vel 
disc:onvenlens stt Indlcans eoquc ipso jubens aut prohtbtms. t ! Essay§.,' p. 110. 
111. 
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lor ~Iarlfy the "twit positions. His definition leaves mu~h to be desired. 
~here is the natural 1_ found? How and by what Is It constituted? And 
exactly in what sense Is the law Unatural 1l1 Von Leyden sUI'Mt8rizes what he 
believes \\QUId be Locke's answer to the last question: 
It Is for the followIng reasons, It seeros. that a law thus known Is called 
by Locke a natural law: <a> the knowledge of It is acquired by man's 
faculties, i.e. "n$ation and reason. the joint exercise of which consti-
tutes what Locke calls the light of nature; In other words, It Is a law 
promulgated by God in a natura' way. I.e. It Is other than a positive I. 
which is known by revelation; (b) it Is e law In confonaity with the 
natural constitution of the universe and, particularly, with the nature of 
man; (c) the precepts of this law are the sane for all men and, like the 
I..,. attaching to natural phenomena but unlike those of different states, 
they do not vary from place to place and froll one time to another .2S 
The It10st fundamental and Important sense in Which the law of nature is 
~inatural" Is omitted by von Leyden because Locke failed to explain It. The law 
Is natural because it is founded in and constituted by human nature itself. 
~he decree or ordination of God directing man to his fincl end took place In the 
Ivery act of creation. God legIslated for man by creating him, wit Jing that he 
Ishould live according to his nature. For $CampI., man Is a created being and 
~s such has a relaUon to God, hIs Creator. The relation Is one of depel'ldeftCy 
In respect to life and the fulfl·llment of man 1s clestlny. Hence man is obllgat81 
to recognize his dependency in adoration. 
Human nature, with all Its Implied relationships to God. to self and to 
pthers, constitutes the foundation and norm of natural law. But Locke did not 
~ke this clear in the early essays. 
The question arises, could Locke have made claar or consistently held that 
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natural law Is founded In rnnao nature?a6 Maurice Cranston, Locke's most 
recent b t ographer It charges that Locke did not pub I ish his IlsaX' .2!! She J.I! gf 
tflSYCe because his Interest in empl rlcism was better served In the later IIW 
and because title had adlDbrated in that EIHX (notably In hIs section on Wom) 
a critical technique which, once applied to the L.aI of Nature, would assuredly 
have shown his ca.e to be untenable. lIl7 
What Cranston evidently refers to is that Locke argues In Book III of the 
IsMY that we cannot know the real essence or neture of a thing. hence ... ean-
not know man. But what Locke clearly criticizes in Book It I Is the posItion 
thet .. can know the sotll ... ence of a thlnt or the MaCt characteristics whld1 
distinguish It from .1 J other things. But this in no way rules out knowing 
enough about man to be able to found morality upon his nature. In fact in 800~ 
t I. Locke very .,llcltly states that IIOrallty fa capable of demonstratIon 
te!stul! we have an unche""""e Idea of man .. a corporeal. rational creature. 
When we say that ''alan Is subject to 1_.n ...... nothing by '_nil but a 
corporeal. rat i OM 1 creature; what the real essence or other quath Ie, 
of that creature are In this case, Is no wey COfIsidered. And therefore, 
whether a child or a changeling be a maR in a physical sense, may amongst 
the naturaltats be disputable as I t wi II, It cenc;erns not at all lithe 
moral man," as I call hl_" which Is this 100000vable. unchangeable Idea. a 
corpo .... l. rat lonal be'ltg.iS 
It Is .Iso evident, as '_tanced by the exanpl., that Locke looks upon 
huraen nature. even In t.he lsax. as the founctation for natura. I .. arad morality 
26Cf• the dIscussion of this on page )0 of this thesis. 
27 ... url " Cranston, John f,9Ske: ~ BI2IrMbY (New York, 1957). ,. 66. 
28!! IsseX. Itl. 9. 16. 
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~hls passage also lends further weight to the consi$ten~y of Locke IS tIl inking .. 
~ .... n nature, then, would certainly seem to be for Locke .. the foundation and 
~nn of natural law. 
But. unfortunate I y .. in the ea r 1 y essays Locke did not make th i 5 po 1 nt 
~Iear, and von Leyden seizes upon the mistake. Locke's argument for the obil-
~tion arising from the law of nature will suffer because of this, too. His 
~rgt.l1leRt on obi I gat ,on appears in the sixth esMY. It slatply develops further 
~Is p~f given in the fourth essay. 
The natural law is bindIng on all men primarily and of .tself llbeceuse this 
~aw eoRtalns a.l1 that Is necessary to make a I.., binding: H29 (a) For obi 19ation 
~ superIor will to wh<:m we are rightly subject I. needed. But God is the 
~uperlor will; and we are subject t.o Him out of Justice, sInce we owe all we 
~re to HIli, and out of necessIty, since ~r very continuance in exlstenee de-
~s on Hlm;'O (b) For obUgatlon. the superior's will GUlst be made known to 
~s. But God's wi 11 Is made known to us through natural lew. The proper U$e 
pf our facuhles will disclose this to us. This WlUi shown to be true In the 
Ifourth essay_ 
uThe resu J, t 15 that, 5 i nee nothl ng e I Ie is requ i red to I rnpose an ob 11-
~t'on but the authority and rightful power of the one who corrmands and the dis-
~losure of hIs will, no one can doubt that the law of nature is blnd!"g on al1 
1aen.1I31 
Von Leyden challenges tofn conclUSion. And in doing so, he introduces a 
29 Esu;a, p. 187. 
lO'bld. 
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~istinetlon which prejudices Locke's \il/hole account of the matter. We say 
'prejudices" because, although Locke's inaccuracy of expression might Justify 
~tchln9 him with his own wI)rds, his Intention. as the complete context wi II 
~lOW. is corta in I y not to use two separate sources 'Of ob II gat ion. The d ist I ne-
~Ion whidl von Leyden insists 00, divides obi igatlons into what he calls moral 
Pbl igations and natural obJ i gat ions: l'Thus_ on the one hand, there are mora) 
~l igatlons which are binding because they arise fr'Om the <:OI111I8nds of a superior 
11tH, which as Loeke puts it, is the formal cause of all obligation. On the 
:>ti1er hand. there are natural 'ObligatIons which are binding because they arise 
Fran man's nature, whIch as we might say, is the material cause of obI fgat 10n.,J2 
On the basis of these two types of obllgati'On, von Leyden finds Locke torn 
~tween two Incompatible theories regarding obligation. The two theories are: 
(I) the voluntarist theory In Which a thing is right because God coowands It, 
!lAd (2) the Intellectualist theory, where 1_ has its foundation In the nature 
i)f thIngs "and Is !lli!! fndep!nden! 2! illl..u33 Von Leyden's treatment 'Of this 
Indicates that these two poSitions are the horns of en Insoluble dilemlila. 
Io.ocke. according to von Leyden, begGn by holding the voluntarist theory where 
\;00 obligatl'Ons would be moral obli!)8ttons, and then shifted to the lntelleetu-
aiist theory where obligations are natural obligations. \'00 Leyden ad.111ts, at 
loast, that Locke attempts ato reach a poSition midway between these two the!)'" 
,165.,,34 
321bJ.d •• p. 50. This is fr(:~n von Leydent!) hlstroch.u;;t:ion. 
33'bld., p. 51. Italics not in the original. 
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Von leyden fl rst exa.llines !:1Orai obi i gat ions, Sha.1ing how ntoo obi igation 
here is u 1 t 'mate 1 y founded in God. in the natura 1 r i gilt wh I en the C rector has 
over His eraation ... 3S In short, God's will does too obliging- But von 
Leyden believes that by the seventh essay Locke hcls definitely shifted to the 
Intellectualist theory. 'lWhat he (Locke) Is attempting now Is to gtve an al-
ternative explanation and to arrive at a purely rationel foundation of ethics. 
He cons I ders mora I ru I as to 00 va lid independent i y oi~ any COimland or externa 1 
cause. 1'3C~ 
Certainly Lock.e wishes to emphasize In the seventn essay the discovery of 
obi igatlon and the prec:epts of natural law as rooted in human nature. But is 
this a Hpurely rational founciationll'/ When Locke states tnat IIthis law does not 
depend on an unstable 8i'ld c:hangoabJe wi II, but on toe eternal order of things,nl 
we have no right to c:oneiude, as von Leyden cioes" that he is making law inde-
pendent of goetts will. or lIindependent of !!!.X, ccmmand or external eausc.H 
God's wi 11 Is not unstable and changeable.. He Is the one who brought into 
being ;Ithe eternal order of things." I..oc:ke nhnseU certainly has no intent,ioo 
of excluding God when referring t.o the eternal order of thIngs. For after not ... 
ing that man IS nature Is such that c:ertain duties. CBnnot be other than they ar(t,~ 
loc:ke states: "And this is not because nature or God (as • should say) could 
not have created man d I fferont i y. Rather the CflIJ$e i;J that. S i nee man has been 
;:iade suc:h as he Is •••• there necessarily resuit from his Inborn c:onstitution 
35'bh! •• p. 50. 
36 ~ .. p. 52. 
37.l~tq .• p. 199. 
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saoo definite duties for him. II.)"} 
God could have created sOinGthlng in plaee of man's nature. But once God 
has "'Ii lied His creation, it stands uilC.Mngeaole. For He is eternal. unehanging 
Truth. Locke has taken an alternative approocll, it is true. but not to arrive. 
at \.'I purely rational foundation of ethics in the sense in which von leyden uses 
these words, as indopendent of God's wi 11 and found bV a c051slderation of human 
nature alone. 
Von Leyden's final query, then, places aJ', illegitimate question when he 
asks: 1IH<M, then, does Locke answer the question: What preciselv is there tl1 
human nature that by itself csn give natural 1.1f its binding force'I 1139 If llin 
human natural! and Ilby itself" iooans disconnected fro;n God's wi 1 J and purpose, 
the answer Is nothing. aut Loe!<e is not trying to found obI igatlon on SO!llI;':l!-
thln9 divorced froll Goo's wO I. What he indicates rather is that iQ.d't !lll 
rlianifosts itself in the law arising out of the very nature of man as kllOWll by 
reason. God's wi 11 is not &Omething superimposed erbit rari lyon man. It is 
r<lti1er, as Loek.e has told us DB along, ordered in a ;"IaY :lsuitable to man's 
nature,!! 50 that it is right to say sim:! tanaltus.ly that natural law is binding 
because God wills it and because It Is gfOurtded in human nature. God willed 
the law by creating lilan \\fith e reason capable of k~lng what is demanded or 
excluded by human nature. 
I..oeke, unfortunate I y, has not made such a connec.t i on between hi s d i f fe rent 
38.l£l<!. 
39IbJd •• p. 51-+. 
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explanations quite so e.x.plicit. But that he Is laboriniJ to explain the natura 
law In this way has even been admitted by von Leyden. 41.) 
IV) The fourth stage of Locke's pr00f considars the universality and per 
petuity of the law of ootUN. We need oniy to c;oosider It in reference to von 
t.eydanls objections ond to (,laintaln his division. When von leyden turns to 
tilis section of his analysis, the matter contained in the seventh essay, he j>re 
supposes the uua I exp) anut i on proposed above, and he ussuras us that Loche IS 
final chotce rests with too Intellectualist theory. The conc:lusionsroochacl 
by Locke In this section are categorized by von leyden as a fourth type of pro" 
position. logical truths. 
This final cl inglng to the rational horn of the eli lemma secures for Locke. 
according to von Leyden. his conviction that moml conclusions are de,.. ved from 
"",,nises with just as much certainty as _thai1'l8tlcal truths. 1I1n fact, it 
seems to fie to fol1ow just as necessarily fr<n the nature of man that. if he is 
man, he Is bound to love and worshIp God, .... as it follows from the nature 0 
a triangle that. If It Is a triangle, Its th~ angles are equal to two right 
41 
angles. 1I With _thematlc5 the reasoning starts from the nature and property 
of fIgures end nur.tbers; in the case of morality, It starts fran the idea of 
man as a ratlonel creature. 
Von leyden's criticism of this indicates again hh whole lIne of thought. 
Even if moral propositions could be used in deduction, he te11s us, ',nora; 
obligations could sti II be regarded as a kind of _eessity differing froo 
4Ovon Leyden COOkrtents tllat locke "attempts to reach a posl tion midway be" 
tween these two thear i es. II Essa¥.~. p. 51. 
41 ~ssaYS, p. 199. These are lockets words. 
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logical necessity as It does fr~.,:n causa' necosslty.u42 The rooson~ we ere 
told, why Locke t.ried to s~ the p"'lssibi 1 ity ~yf deductive Inference \.,.5 Has 
though he feared that unless ethics could be sha.fn to be grounded In God's wi 11 
2.t to adult of mathematica' demonstration. natural law night appear as a Illere 
43 l!! indlcatf~a. i.e. Indicating but not binding men to, moral rules. 1I (Note 
agaIn von Leyden's forced disjunction between (',od's wltl and natural demon-
stration.) The reason, according to von Leyden. why Locke did not rest obI i-
gaUon on God's will was that "for sonte rGO.u;on Locke considered the voluntarist 
theory as not altogether $<ltisfactory; . perhaps he felt that It was too 000" 
sided a doetrtne and that a.ong with the concept of wi 11 It introduced an e10-
~ 
ment of arbitrariness into moral ity." Hence, locke introduced the tdM of 
a body of rules In confonnity45 with rational nature to stand Side by side with 
the idea of natural 18\'1 as the will of God. Moreover. says von Leyden, these 
46 two accounts "must have seemed to locke to be c:.onpatible. 1I 
Von Leyden. however, sees only conft Ict in the two theories. He goes on 
to Instance several expressions of Locke whIch apparently manifest this eon-
flict. For example, fron Locke's phrase which refers the ground of obedience 
42lbid., 
-
p. 55. 
~, ,0') (.t';,> 56. Ibid •• p. The word 1101"" not ital iclz.ed in the ortglnal. 
l ! 
++'bld. 
-4'-~Confonnlty with rational nature See"I1S to mean for von leyden merely some-
thing that "goes well t'~itf1n hWilan nature. tonfof"lrlity. !1fMever. is int.endod in 
a stronger sense of IIbelonging to the very nature of: a thing to act in such Ii 
w(Jy. 1I 
46 Essal~.J p. S6. 
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to the law of nature as a "rational apprehension of what is right,)+1 von Leyder, 
infers that: flit would follaN frQU this that right and wrong are independent of 
the wi I i of God and that 1 tis not tauto I ogous to say of an act i on calTllanded by 
4~~ God that it' 5 rl ght or good.1I ~. 
4) The root of von Leyden's difficulty ~~S boen discussed earlier. The 
difficulty lies with a confused notion about the way in which God decreed the 
natural law. Perhaps, too. a mistaken idea of God's wi)) underl ies the di ffi-
culty. God's will is not arbitrary but IS guided by His intellect. It Is in 
the very nature of a will so to act. If this wore not so, God's will would be 
an i rrat ions} thing_ The naturos of all exi sti n9 things are reflections of Hh 
essence which might or might not have been brought into <a'tistencej but they arc 
oot independent entities. Consequently, man's nature, since it is simply a 
participation in God's essenee, is not a separate nonu distinct from the decrees 
of God. It Is precisely human nature, with its special ordination to God. and 
its speCial way of reaching God .. t:'lat God wi lIed into existence. In willing 
that nature. God had to wi 11 whatever belonged necessarn ly to that nature, in-
cluding the necessary relations and obligations arising from such a nature. 
His decree was for man to exist and to Jive according to his nature; conse'" 
quently. to obser~e the law arising from that nature, which is the natural law. 
Ef we view Locke's argument now as a whole, it is apparent that it is far 
from satisfactory. But neither is It the weak thing that von Leydan depicted 
471~!!!. t p. 185. 
48 tbld., p. 57. 
-
49Cf• page 65 of the thesis. 
I t to be. Von Leyden f I ra t s I n91 eO out Loel<e· s observat Ion t hat man can reason 
~$ his starting point. This missed Lockeia own initial stress on God's ex-
istence and governance of the world, with the result that It put Locke's argu" 
~nt In the wrong light fran the beginning. By doing this von !..eyden also 
~akens Locke's teleological explanation of man and lays him open to the charge 
pf lnaklng transitions fron factual statements to ethical conclusions without 
~ustlflcation. The truth Is that man is obi 1ged by the rules he discerns in hil 
~ture because he perceives thetr necessary connoc:tion with an end which is of 
~bsolute moral necessity_ Then, besides missing the obligation implicit In 
p.ocke's teleological developnent, when he treats fon-really of obi igetion. von 
,..eyden forces a false dilerrma upon Locke which renders his argument actually in-
Ponsistent. Then finally, by choosing the intellectualist theory for Locke. he 
~riticizes him for moving again from a logical necessity, a factual "is", to a 
"""ral necessity, an ethical l'ought". 
If the text of Lockels essays is carefuUy studied, a thread of argume:nt 
far more consistent than von leyden would allow reveals 1 tseU. For. despite 
50 the criticism of these essay!' as "second-rate qual ity" and as "confused and 
muddl~t51, Locke has offered a'fairly accurate and valid argument for the eK-
lstence, knowabi 1 Ity, and binding force of the natural lew. Admittedly his 
presentation leads easily to misinterpretation; the conflict between his volun-
taristic and intellectualistic approaches are reconciled more by the accidental 
SOD. J. Allan, IIReviow of Essays," Philo$Opt'!.x. XX (April. 1956), p. J 84. 
51p. G. Lucas, IIDJscussion: John locke.' 1ho PhilosoPhical 2.u,arter1..x. VI 
(April J 1956). p. 174. 
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'raction towards which his prudence led than by his actual expression of a 
He used only a handful of words, sense, reason. obligation. 
:115 position. This, of courso, is arritating and inexcusable 
a modern age accustoned to careful distinctions and \fIOrd analysis. Loc:ke's 
ression is weak. His insight Into truth, however, Is not. Overlooking 
:aany details, we can cone I ude that subs tant i a II y the argument and doct r I ne of 
he i,5aYS 2!l!!l! L_ 2f. Nature show a basic consistency with Locke's later and 
re mature thought, and at least .. reasonable validity In themselves. 
Th I s I nqu I ry was notund.rtaken to unve, i the d. 5eovery of a new aoo pro-
ounder exposition of natural 1&'# doetrine. Out tile investigation does cast 
light on the menta) journeys of a great philosopher. a philosopher whose 
c;;trhle of the natural law hos had profound historical signi ficancc. particu· 
1arly in this country. The Investigation reveals a far daeper consistency be-
ItWlsen Locke the empiricist and Locke the rationalist than has been historically 
ranted; and It makes elear Lockets concern for mora) problems. The essays 
re more than an "added" work of Locke's. The doctrine of natural law is more 
han Just. corner of Locke'. thought. It stands In the center of his whole 
lIosophy. In his search for e practical political theory, In his search for 
demonstrable ethics, In his InvestigatIon of the theory of knowing. his con-
ern for man's conckH;t and morality is uppermost. And despite his apparent 
.eaning to hedonism. and hls fuJ Jer writing on the law of fashion, from the 
rly essays to his last works his conviction is unshaken that the law of na'cure 
lis the only true touchstone of moral rectitude. uS! 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I • 'lUNARY souua 
Locke, John. &! ~nln9 HUlMn ""'~I~ Edited with Notes and 
Introduction byAl r C. 'r ... r. OX o. • 
........ _- ,!SHX,.2!l:r Jd!! .Qf ,..!ure. The Latin Tekt with. Translation, 
Int uct on. Notesby W. von Leyda. Oxford, 1954. 
-_ .. _-. D!2 TrMt'!!!!f s~ve' ... nt. 
by W. S. Carpenter. • 1§i4. Edited with Note. and IntroductIon 
II. SECONDARY SOUReas 
A. BOOKS 
ron, Richerd I. ~ LiS". 2nd ed. Oxtorcl, 1955. 
lerlln. 'salah. Ill! _ 2f Inl 'pte....,t. Ioston. 1956. 
Boas, Ieor,.. !t!! MIg&: Iredltlons !!! Eut"!1!M8 PhllgsophY. New York. 1929. 
C .. s.rer, Irnst. !h! Phl19§9lhx if the "I.lhSf!!!!nt. Princeton, 1951. 
C, .. tota, Maurice. ~ Ic!!l!i. ~ I'osr!P!!r. .. York, 1957 • 
• tlntrevel. A. P. Mturt. 1:!!. L.ondon. 1951. 
'arrell. walter, O.P. I!l!. "tur., Kora • .IdM AGco."lnl1211. TMeu .-
!uarez. DJtGhltnl~'. 
'ras." Alexander C. ~ock!. London, 1890. 
GlblOA t ___ a ~OCke" I!l!9a !f Knowleellt I!!l Jll Hlltorlcal "eJ,tI!!!. 
Cambridge. t JI. 
Iouth. ~. W. .ohn Wke', Political ~hI '9JI!Ihx.. OXford, '9SO. 
76 
77 
Huard, Pau). l!:!!. IUrQJ!!!!! !1iq,d. london. 1953. 
Jones, W. T" &. HlsCoa 2f W •• tern ~hllosOPhy. New York, 1952 • 
.... ~ht. Sterling p. ~he Mgr.l .!!!! Pol iUc;al Ph119!OJ!h't 2! :!.2!!! 19cke. 
New York, 1918 • 
.... ---. 2'tr Philosophical Traditions_ New York. '955. 
!Horrls, C. R. Loc;ke, I!!rke'ex. Hume. OXford, 1930. 
O'Connor, D. J. John bocke. london, 1952. 
Ru.se". Bertrand. A !jlstorx 9! Western PhIl2PfhX. New York, 1945. 
iThUly, Frank. ! History 2f l!bJ1osophX. New York, 1914. 
INrlght, 8enJII1lln F •• Jr. erlgn Interlretatl2!!! g! Natural baw. '_ridge, 
.... MChu .. tt •• 1'31. 
Yolton, John W. John Locke !!!!l !!l!. Wax g! '4!t!. OXford, 1956. 
I. ARTleLa 
IAllan, O. J. ''Revl. of John Locke: Is says Oft the Law of Nature,lt Phl19!Ol!!X 
XX (April. 1956), 184-185. 
~il ins, J_s. liThe Yeer in Philosophy. 1954," TtRulhS. XXX (Spring '955), 
84-85. 
!Lenz, John W. ''Lockets 's .. y. on the law of Nature." PhII0!Ol!!!Y!!!! Phenome-
fJ2101151' RelNrih, XVII (September 1956), lOS-II' • 
.. ucas. P. G. ..., $CUss lool John Locke,lI !!l!. Ph""loeh.cal g,uarterty. VI (Apr I 
'956), 174-176. 
lUrk, Russell. "John locke Reconsidered," KoRth, XIV (November 1955), 294-
303. 
Walhout. Donald. tlls and Ought,lI Ille Jour!!!) .2f PhlJ9f9Phx, LtV (January 
1957). 342-348. 
rolton. John v_ ''Revl., of John loc:ke." Ihe Ph 112!!fhlca I, Review, LXIV (July 
'955). 487-49). 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submi tted by Arthur F. HcGovern, S.J., 
h~s been read and ayproved by three members of the Department of 
Philosophy. 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact 
that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the 
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, 
form, and mechanical accuracy. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the dagree of Master of Arts. 
t!JJL~~~!J,rJi4-
..Jet u (:::,. 
